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Developing a Durable Right to Health 
Care 
Erin C. Fuse Brown* 
ABSTRACT 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) 
signature accomplishment was the creation of a statutory right 
to health care for the uninsured. This is a momentous change in 
policy, addressing one of the most vexing social issues of our 
time and affecting millions of people and billions of dollars of 
the U.S. economy. This ambition and the degree of societal and 
political debate leading up to the Act’s passage suggests that it 
is a “superstatute,” a rare breed of statute that can, among other 
things, create rights and institutions more typically thought to 
be the province of constitutional undertaking. Nevertheless, the 
structure of the ACA’s right to health care makes it fragile and 
reduces its chances of becoming a durable right. The ACA may 
end up as a “quasi-superstatute:” a statute that aspires but fails 
to become a superstatute through a failure of political and 
public entrenchment. The problem is that the right to health 
care is to be delivered largely through changes to the private 
health insurance market, requiring the collective action of many 
reluctant actors, including unwilling states and recalcitrant 
individuals. Even though it survived legal challenge before the 
Supreme Court, the ACA’s right to health care faces significant 
political and market challenges that threaten to retrench rather 
than entrench its benefits in the public’s mind. The vulnerability 
of this right to health care is concentrated early in its lifespan, 
and if it survives these early years, forces such as the 
endowment effect may strengthen the right’s durability as its 
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benefits take hold. The fragility of the ACA’s right to health care 
and its uncertain path to durability provide lessons to future 
framers of a right to health care regarding the long timeframe 
for implementation, uncertainty, complexity, and structure. The 
risk of becoming a “quasi-superstatute” highlights the 
importance of how such social reforms ought to be structured to 
achieve entrenchment and durability after the ink is dry on the 
new legislation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nikki White had aspired to become a physician when she 
was diagnosed with lupus at the age of twenty-one. After her 
diagnosis, she set that ambition aside, but she found work at a 
hospital trauma unit that came with health insurance benefits. 
After becoming too ill to continue her job, she lost her health 
insurance coverage and moved back home to live with her 
parents. For the next few years, she struggled to gain coverage 
FUSE BROWN_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/2013  11:40 AM 
2013] DURABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE 441 
through TennCare, her state’s Medicaid system, gaining 
coverage only to lose it again when the program suffered cuts. 
No private insurance company would cover her with a 
preexisting medical condition. Although the vast majority of 
lupus patients live a normal lifespan, it is an illness that 
requires extensive medical management.1 Nikki was not so 
lucky; she was rushed to the hospital after collapsing at home 
and succumbed to her illness at the age of thirty-two in severe 
pain, bleeding internally, and suffering multiple organ failure. 
Her physicians believe that she would not have died had she 
had health insurance and been able to receive proper care for 
her disease. Instead, she joined the approximately 18,000 
Americans who die every year from a lack of health care 
coverage.2 
Had she lived long enough, Nikki could have obtained 
health care coverage under the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA). Among its many provisions, 
the ACA’s most significant is one that creates a right to health 
care in this country for the uninsured.3 Having largely survived 
legal challenge at the Supreme Court, this right is a 
momentous change in American health policy. The practical 
question for most people like Nikki White, however, is if they 
lose their job or their health insurance, will the ACA provide a 
meaningful right to health care that they can count on in the 
future? The answer turns on whether the right to health care 
created by the Act is durable. A durable right is a right that 
will last for a long time without deterioration. 
Analyzing the durability of the ACA’s right to health care 
requires an evaluation of what makes a right durable. The 
quintessential durable right is a constitutional right, which, 
once established, is entrenched against political or partisan 
attack through the difficult amendment process of the U.S. 
Constitution. That may be one of the reasons scholars and 
advocates alike look to the Constitution—a constitutional right 
                                                          
 1. Jane Zhang, Amid Fight for Her Life, Lupus Patient Fights for 
Insurance, POST-GAZETTE (Dec. 5, 2006, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-
gazette.com/ pg/06339/743713-84.stm. 
 2. Nicholas D. Kristof, The Body Count at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 
2009, at WK18. 
 3. Barry Furrow, Health Reform and Ted Kennedy, The Art of Politics 
and Persistence, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 445, 447 (2011) (“The ACA 
is . . . a reform of private employment insurance, intended to increase coverage 
for those who are currently uninsured.”). 
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comes with a level of structural entrenchment through Article 
V amendment requirements, which makes the right resilient 
against the political whims of the time. Contrary to the popular 
and scholarly bias toward locating a right to health care in the 
Constitution, there is no federal constitutional right to health 
care.4 Instead the federal right to health care is largely a 
creature of statute, which does not automatically come with 
political protection or structural entrenchment. 
In the context of a statutory right to health care, there is a 
patchwork of federal statutes that cover various groups: 
Medicare, Medicaid, the Veterans Administration health 
system, TRICARE for active duty military and their families, 
the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act 
(EMTALA), and, most recently, the ACA. The right to health 
care under the Medicare program, in particular, is an example 
of a durable statutory right that has become a cherished and 
politically entrenched right.5 The problem with the statutory 
right to health care until now has been its patchwork nature, 
covering only certain subpopulations and leaving in excess of 
50 million uninsured.6 The ACA purports to fill in the gap by 
extending a statutory right to health care to those previously 
not covered by an existing federal statutory right or through 
private health insurance. It is uncertain, however, whether the 
ACA’s right to health care will become a durable right like the 
right under Medicare, or whether it will fall short of its promise 
of assuring access to health care for the uninsured. 
The statutory nature of the right to health care in this 
country is consistent with theories of sub-constitutionalism, 
which posit that much of the constitutional work in this 
country, namely creation of rights and governmental 
institutions, is accomplished through statutory or regulatory 
law.7 According to one vein of sub-constitutional scholarship 
                                                          
 4. Puneet K. Sandhu, Comment, A Legal Right to Health Care: What Can 
the United States Learn from Foreign Models of Health Rights Jurisprudence?, 
95 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1162 (2007) (“Despite the moral, citizenship, and equal 
opportunity rationales for a right to health care, the Supreme Court has not 
recognized health care as a constitutional right.”). 
 5. Furrow, supra note 3, at 452–453. 
 6. Table HI05. Health Insurance Coverage Status and Type of Coverage 
by State and Age for All People: 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032010/health/h05_000.htm (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2012). 
 7. See generally Mark Tushnet, Subconstitutional Constitutional Law: 
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popularized by William Eskridge, Jr. and John Ferejohn, the 
heavy lifting of sub-constitutionalism is accomplished through 
a breed of federal statutes called “superstatutes.”8 
Superstatutes address serious social problems and gain such 
broad public support that they are entrenched against future 
political attack.9 Three features distinguish superstatutes from 
ordinary statutes: first, the statute must substantially alter the 
existing regulatory baseline with a new principle or policy; 
second, the statute is generated after a long period of public 
deliberation; and third, the new principle or policy “sticks” in 
the public culture such that it becomes a fundamental or 
axiomatic legal norm.10 
One way to create a durable right via statute is through a 
superstatute. The same features that make a superstatute 
“super,” namely public support and the entrenchment that 
follows, also make the rights created by such a statute durable. 
The ACA has the pedigree of a superstatute, achieving a 
significant change from existing coverage baselines and the 
largest expansion of health care access in a generation.11 The 
legislation was undertaken to address the serious social 
problem of lack of universal access to health care, following a 
period of intense public and political debate and deliberation. 
Nevertheless, the ACA is in a particularly vulnerable period, 
and its prospects for creating a durable right to health care are, 
at best, uncertain. 
One limitation of the superstatutes theory is that it does 
not describe how to predict whether a statute will be a 
superstatute. Applying the criteria for superstatutes, it is 
unknown at the outset whether a statute will become a 
superstatute (and thus whether the rights it creates become 
durable rights) until it has withstood the test of time. Some 
statutes address important social problems and undergo 
                                                          
Supplement, Sham, or Substitute?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1871 (2001) 
(providing a commentary on the use of subconstitutional doctrines). 
 8. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF 
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 26 (2010) [hereinafter A 
REPUBLIC OF STATUTES]. 
 9. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE 
L.J. 1215, 1216 (2001). 
 10. Id. at 1230–31. 
 11. See Furrow, supra note 3, at 453–54 (“The ACA will harmonize health 
care in the United States with the idea of universal coverage of all citizens as 
a right, in large part by moving private health insurance closer to quasi-social 
insurance.”). 
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serious public deliberation, but somehow fail to live up to their 
promise of solving the social challenge. These statutes may 
reflect the aspirational characteristic of superstatutes, but fail 
to become entrenched through widespread public support. I 
propose that these would-be, but failed, superstatutes occupy 
their own category called “quasi-superstatutes.” Quasi-
superstatutes fall short of their “super” aspirations because the 
rights or new legal norms they create are not fully accepted by 
the public, either because the public does not agree with the 
norm or because not enough of the public experiences the 
benefits of the new right or legal norm before it is rolled back 
by courts or future Congresses. Given that entrenchment is the 
key to durability, assessing the aspects of a statute that will 
make it more or less likely to become entrenched help predict 
whether a statute will be a superstatute or quasi-superstatute. 
This Article’s central claim is that although the ACA 
creates a new right to health care for the uninsured, the 
structure of this right to health care makes it fragile and more 
likely to end up as a quasi-superstatute than a superstatute. In 
particular, the ACA’s right to health care may be structurally 
weaker than the right under other federal programs like 
Medicare. Rather than creating a federally-funded and 
administered benefit program that can rapidly deliver benefits 
to wide population and gain support, the ACA bases its right on 
private health insurance reforms with the following 
vulnerabilities: (1) the right faces a long time-frame for 
implementation without delivering benefits while susceptible to 
political attacks; (2) judicial challenges to the individual 
mandate and Medicaid provisions created uncertainty that 
delayed implementation; and (3) the right depends on the 
creation of a private insurance market through the collective 
action of a host of potentially reluctant private actors, states, 
and individuals. 
The ACA’s uncertain path to durability depends largely on 
whether it survives the long time period prior to 
implementation of its benefits. Once its benefits begin, a 
diverse interest group may emerge to defend the ACA’s right to 
health care, including not only individuals who gain benefits, 
but also the insurance companies and health care providers 
who gain new customers and patients. The greater the sunk 
costs by those implementing the reforms, the greater the 
incentive to maintain the current arrangement rather than 
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abandoning it for a new approach. If the fragility of the ACA’s 
right to health care relegates it to the quasi-superstatute 
category, its weaknesses provide several strategic lessons for 
those continuing to seek a durable right to health care. In 
particular, efforts to develop a durable right should deliver 
benefits quickly, while avoiding statutory complexity that 
makes it difficult for the public to understand its benefits and 
legal uncertainty that inhibits implementation and confidence 
among stakeholder groups. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the 
current landscape of the federal right to health care in the 
United States, tracing the absence of a broad, federal 
constitutional right to health care and the statutory efforts to 
fill the constitutional gaps, including how the ACA creates a 
right to health care. Part II analyzes the durability of the 
ACA’s right to health care, drawing on and expanding upon the 
sub-constitutionalism literature and theory of superstatutes to 
add a new category called “quasi-superstatutes” to capture 
those that aspire to be, but fail to achieve the entrenchment 
required to become a superstatute. Part III explores how the 
ACA’s right to health care could survive despite its fragility as 
well as the implications of the ACA’s prospects as a quasi-
superstatute for efforts to develop a durable right to health care 
in the United States. 
I. CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 
CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 
To understand what makes a right to health care durable, 
the “right to health care” must be defined. The right to health 
care is the non-excludable right to access and receive some 
minimum level of health care services.12 
The right to health care is distinct from the right to health. 
Conceptually, a right to health is broader than a right to health 
care, because a right to health encompasses all the actions 
government can take to ensure the health of the population, 
which would include not just health care services, but also 
                                                          
 12. See Mark Earnest & Dayna Bowen Matthew, A Property Right to 
Medical Care, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 65, 69 (2008) (recognizing a property interest 
in health care, defined as “the medical goods and services that hospitals, 
physicians, and other providers deliver”); Sandhu, supra note 4, at 1160 (“A 
right to health care . . . entitles right-holders to the “goods and services” that 
aid in the achievement of health and, consequently, obligates the government 
to ensure access to these goods and services.”). 
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adequate provision for the myriad social, economic, and 
environmental determinants of health, such as housing, 
education, employment, nutrition, and clean air and water.13 
Such a right to health is often cast in the framework of human 
rights and, due to the impossibility of guaranteeing the health 
of all persons, is aspirational.14 As a precatory guiding 
principle, such a broadly conceived right to health is nowhere to 
be found in the U.S. Constitution and, as has been observed in 
states with constitutional rights to health, is of limited utility 
in terms of enforcement, justiciability, or delivery.15 
This Article focuses on the narrower, legal right to health 
care, rather than the right to health. Even the narrower 
conception of a right to health care is difficult to define without 
grappling with the normative and practical judgment of 
defining what substantively ought to be included in a minimum 
benefits package constrained by limited resources and capacity 
of the health care delivery system. A minimum benefits 
package to which everyone would have a basic right will also be 
ever-evolving as new technologies and scientific discoveries 
                                                          
 13. U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standards of Health, General 
Comment, U.N. Doc. No. 14. CESCR, E/C. 12/2000/4, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/E.C.12.2000.4.En (“The Committee 
interprets the right to health . . . as an inclusive right extending not only to 
timely and appropriate health care but also to the underlying determinants of 
health, such as access to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, an 
adequate supply of safe food, nutrition and housing, healthy occupational and 
environmental conditions, and access to health-related education and 
information, including on sexual and reproductive health.”). 
 14. William P. Kratzke, Tax Subsidies, Third-Party-Payments, and Cross-
Subsidization: America’s Distorted Health Care Markets, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 
279, 390 (2009) (“Obviously, no system can guarantee any particular level of 
health.”); Sandhu, supra note 4, at 1160 (“A right to health implies that every 
person is entitled to perfect health. Although perfect health may be achievable 
at some point in the future, it is not a realistic benchmark against which to 
adjudicate a right.”). 
 15. See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right 
to Health Care, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1325, 1392 (2010) (“More than a dozen 
states give constitutional imprimatur to health. Judicial decisions in the seven 
states examined demonstrate a general reluctance to recognize affirmative, 
enforceable health rights. Indeed, there is not a single provision or case 
supporting a universal right to publicly funded health care.”); see also Sandhu, 
supra note 4, at 1158 (“[T]he problem of defining and implementing a right to 
health is three-fold: indeterminacy (how to characterize it), justiciability (how 
to enforce it), and progressive realization (how to raise the standard over 
time).”). 
FUSE BROWN_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/2013  11:40 AM 
2013] DURABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE 447 
change the scope of medical care.16 Some have argued that the 
right to health care should be defined as the amount of health 
care that can be delivered in an equal manner, given the 
country’s resources, to all of its citizens.17 Others propose that 
the right ought to be defined by the level of care that society 
may use its collective coercive power to make universally 
accessible.18 In practice, the right to health care is often defined 
in categorical terms, by types of services, level of coverage, and 
consumer obligations and protections. This was the approach 
taken by Congress in the ACA, defining an “essential benefits 
package” as including items and services in certain general 
categories.19 While development of the ACA’s definition of an 
essential benefits package may have been informed by ethical 
or human rights considerations, the essential benefits package 
was based on what a typical U.S. employer-based health 
benefits package covers.20 This fact underscores the point that 
                                                          
 16. Daniel Callahan, What is the Reasonable Demand on Health Care 
Resources? Designing a Basic Package of Benefits, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 1, 2 (1992) (“It has proven impossible, however, to use ‘medical need’ as 
a single meaningful criterion for a basic health care package. Instead, that 
package must be grounded in an array of ingredients—medical, ethical, social, 
and political. More importantly, there must be a political dimension to the 
idea of a basic package or at least some role for the public to express its own 
values about what it believes is a minimally adequate level of care.”). 
 17. See Sandhu, supra note 4, at 1160 (“A right to health care may be 
defined as equality of access: whatever health care resources society provides 
must be provided to everyone on an equal basis.”); Kratzke, supra note 14, at 
391–92 (“Disagreement over the extent of an entitlement to health care does 
not focus on a minimum level of care but on what is an acceptable level of 
(in)equality.”). 
 18. See Paul T. Menzel, The Cultural Moral Right to a Basic Minimum of 
Accessible Health Care, 21 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 79, 90 (2011). 
 19. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 
1302, 124 Stat. 119, 163–68 (2010) (including in the essential benefits package 
the following services: (1) ambulatory patient services; (2) emergency services; 
(3) hospitalization; (4) maternity and newborn care; (5) mental health and 
substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment; (6) 
prescription drugs; (7) rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices; (8) 
laboratory services; (9) preventive and wellness services and chronic disease 
management; and (10) pediatric services, including oral and vision care). The 
task of further explicating the details of the minimum benefits package is left, 
like much of the ACA’s implementation, to the Secretary of the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS). 
 20. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1302(b)(2)(A). The 
Institute of Medicine recommends the essential benefits package be modeled 
after a typical small-group plan rather than large-group plan due to concerns 
regarding affordability. See INST. OF MED., ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: 
BALANCING COVERAGE AND COST 86 (Cheryl Ulmer et al. eds., 2011). 
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any practical definition of a right to health care in the United 
States is inextricably tied to the health care delivery system 
currently in existence, such that a right to health care is often 
framed as a right to a basic level of health insurance. For all 
but the extremely wealthy or supremely healthy, meaningful 
access to health care services in the U.S. requires financing 
through health insurance.21 Thus, the right to health care can 
take the form of a right to non-excludable access to a minimum 
level of health services that is financed through affordable 
health insurance coverage. 
This Part sets forth the current state of the federal right to 
health care in this county, identifying the absence of a federal 
constitutional right to health care and the existing federal 
statutes that create rights to health care for a variety of sub-
populations. It then examines the right to health care created 
by the ACA and how its structure differs from other federal 
rights to health care. 
A. ABSENCE OF A FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HEALTH 
CARE 
It is generally agreed that there is no broad right to health 
or health care under the federal constitution.22 As other 
                                                          
 21. See Mark A. Hall, Approaching Universal Coverage With Better Safety-
Net Programs for the Uninsured, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 9, 9 
(2011); Eleanor D. Kinney, Recognition of the International Human Right to 
Health and Health Care in the United States, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 335, 356 
(2008) (“Health insurance coverage is the most important means for assuring 
that individuals have access to expensive health care services.”); Kratzke, 
supra note 14, at 281 (“Health insurance is a payment system through which 
Americans receive their medical care, even the predictable routine health care, 
the cost of which should not be beyond the means of most of them.”). While the 
right to health insurance is a proxy for the right to health care for most, it 
remains conceivable that a right to health care could be fulfilled through the 
direct provision of health care services, such as the services provided through 
publicly funded clinics and safety-net hospitals. See Hall, supra note 21, at 9 
(“Insurance, after all, is not an end in itself; it is the best means of access to 
affordable care. But, if other means to minimally acceptable access exist, they 
may provide a form of non-insurance, direct-access coverage that helps to fill 
the remaining coverage gap for the uninsured.”). 
 22. See Leonard, supra note 15, at 1329 (“[T]he U.S. Constitution does not 
explicitly or implicitly recognize health as a right.”); Tom Stacy, The Courts, 
the Constitution, and a Just Distribution of Health Care, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 77, 82, 91 & n. 64 (1993–94) (“The Supreme Court has now rejected the 
notion of a constitutional welfare right to health care and other basic goods, 
such as education.”); Kenneth Wing, The Right to Health Care in the United 
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scholars have argued extensively, the U.S. Constitution 
provides neither a textual nor structural basis for such a 
right.23 Health is never mentioned in the Constitution, a 
document that is often described as providing a charter of 
negative rights that limit government action rather than 
impose any affirmative obligation of the government to provide 
for the health or welfare of its citizens.24 Scholars have often 
pointed to (and criticized) this feature of American 
constitutionalism, comparing it to other countries’ or states’ 
constitutional obligations to provide their citizens health care 
or other social and economic goods.25 Despite the limitations of 
a conceptual dichotomy between positive rights (e.g., 
entitlements to social goods) or negative rights (e.g., liberties or 
freedom from interference),26 this distinction is a useful 
description of the federal constitutional posture toward a right 
to health.27 For example, the Supreme Court has recognized 
                                                          
States, 2 ANNALS HEALTH L. 161, 162 (1993) (“[T]he United States 
Constitution does not require the federal government, the state governments, 
or any other level of government to protect the health of its citizens collectively 
or individually.”). 
 23. See Leonard, supra note 15, at 1329 (“By contrast to several state 
constitutions, the federal constitution does not expressly reference the word 
“health” in any provision.”); Wing, supra note 22, at 162; see also Kinney, 
supra note 21, at 353 (“The Federal Constitution is silent on the matters of 
health and health care.”). 
 24. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
195 (1989) (“[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself 
requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens 
against invasion by private actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on 
the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety 
and security.”); Barksy v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472–73 (1954) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The Bill of Rights does not say . . . . what 
government must give, but rather what it may not take away.”); Jackson v. 
City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he Constitution is a 
charter of negative rather than positive liberties. The men who wrote the Bill 
of Rights were not concerned that government might do too little for the people 
but that it might do too much to them.”); see also, Helen Hershkoff, “Just 
Words”: Common Law and the Enforcement of State Constitutional Social and 
Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1524 (2010) (“American 
constitutionalism consistently is seen as excluding social and economic 
rights.”). 
 25. See Sandhu, supra note 4, at 1154; see also Leonard, supra note 15, at 
1391–92. 
 26. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 266–71 (1978). 
 27. Abigail Moncrieff, The Freedom of Health, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 2209, 
2211 (2011) (“Unlike the international human right to health, this American 
freedom of health would operate primarily as a restriction on—rather than as 
an obligation for—governmental regulation of medical decision-making.”). 
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certain negative rights involving health or health care under 
the Due Process Clause: including the freedom of health care 
decision-making, privacy, and access in the context of end of 
life, health information privacy, and abortion under the Due 
Process Clause.28 When government does provide health care 
under benefit programs such as Medicare or Medicaid, the 
benefits must be administered in accordance with the Equal 
Protection Clause.29 Nevertheless, the Court has not recognized 
a generally applicable positive right to health care, and it 
seems unlikely ever to do so.30 
An affirmative constitutional right to health care has been 
recognized only in very limited circumstances, such as where 
persons have lost the liberty to care for themselves. For 
example, the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment requires provision of medical 
treatment to prisoners,31 and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires the state to ensure the 
                                                          
 28. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 115 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 
438, 443 (1972); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997). 
Cf. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286–87 (1990) (finding a Due 
Process liberty interest in patient’s right to refuse life-sustaining treatment 
but upholding state law requiring clear and convincing evidence of patient’s 
wishes). 
 29. See Stacy, supra note 22, at 83 (“[W]hen government spends its 
resources on goods that greatly influence a person’s life opportunities, such as 
health care, it must do so in a way that[] promotes rough equality of access to 
at least some minimally adequate level of opportunity.”); Wing, supra note 22, 
at 164 (“In authorizing or implementing such programs as Medicaid, 
Medicare, or any of the other federal, state, or local health care financing or 
service activities, the government must comply with important 
constitutionally-imposed constraints, particularly the nondiscrimination 
requirements of equal protection and the ‘fairness’ requirements of due 
process as imposed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”). 
 30. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 
464, 469 (1977); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (declining to 
find welfare rights in the Constitution); Leonard, supra note 15, at 1330 
(“Setting aside well-meaning proposals, the likelihood of a federal 
constitutional amendment identifying health as a right is all but 
unimaginable.”); see also Stacy, supra note 22, at 77 (“[A]nother unquestioned 
premise holds that legislatures are the sole forum for any reform of the 
distribution of health care, and that the Constitution, as interpreted and 
enforced by the judiciary, has virtually nothing to say. It is understandable 
that this premise should be taken for granted. As a practical matter, the 
current Supreme Court will not significantly involve itself in this issue, and 
any reform must emerge from Congress.”). 
 31. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). 
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reasonable safety of the involuntarily committed.32 Scholars 
have also advanced arguments for a constitutionally protected 
property interest in health care from a federally-funded and -
subsidized delivery system or a constitutional right to access 
potentially life-saving but non-FDA approved drugs or human 
organs as a form of medical self-defense.33 These are narrow 
exceptions (or proposed exceptions) to the general maxim that 
the Constitution does not guarantee a broad right to health 
care. 
Perhaps the reason scholars and advocates continue to try 
to locate a right to health care in the Constitution is that 
constitutional recognition makes a right seem more permanent 
or durable. Constitutional rights are structurally entrenched 
against political encroachment because of the supremacy of the 
Constitution relative to the laws of the political branches of 
government and because of the difficult Article V amendment 
process.34 Recognizing a constitutional right to health care also 
conveys a normative message about the value of such a right to 
the American people, consistent with the canonical reverence 
with which Americans regard their founding document.35 From 
a practical standpoint, those lamenting the legislature’s 
longstanding political inability to act may be attracted to a 
judicial recognition of a constitutional right to health care 
because it would command the legislature to effectuate the 
right.36 Despite this scholarly and popular bias toward 
constitutional rights, existing federal rights to health care are 
almost entirely statutory in derivation. 
B. EXISTING FEDERAL STATUTORY RIGHTS TO HEALTH CARE 
In the absence of a constitutional right to health care, 
                                                          
 32. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982). 
 33. See Earnest & Matthew, supra note 12 at 69; Eugene Volokh, Essay, 
Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment for 
Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1835 (2007). 
 34. See A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 115. 
 35. John F. Preis, Constitutional Enforcement By Proxy, 95 VA. L. REV. 
1663, 1665–67 (2009) (noting that “Americans love their Constitution,” and 
arguing that contrary to this constitutional preference, sub-constitutional law 
may also be constitutive of the national order). 
 36. See Sandhu, supra note 4, at 1169 (“A constitutional right to 
healthcare in the United States, or perhaps even the threat of a constitutional 
amendment, would force political action to break the special interest logjam 
that has bedeviled efforts at healthcare reform by obligating Congress to 
address healthcare comprehensively.”). 
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Congress has provided health care to various subgroups of the 
U.S. population through statutes. These statutes create a right 
to health care for those who fall within the covered categories, 
primarily by creating a federally-funded benefit program and 
committing to the provision or financing of health care services 
for those eligible to participate. 
The Medicare program provides coverage to citizens and 
legal residents sixty-five and older, the disabled, those with 
end-stage renal disease or amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Lou 
Gehrig’s disease), and individuals exposed to certain 
environmental health hazards.37 Medicaid and the Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) are administered and 
funded through federal-state cooperation to provide health care 
services to eligible poor.38 Medicaid eligibility varies by state, 
but currently extends only to a subgroup of the poor, including 
children, pregnant women, the blind, and certain disabled and 
elderly.39 The federal government also provides health care 
coverage and services to active duty military members, retirees, 
and their families under the TRICARE program40 and to 
disabled and low-income veterans under the Veterans Health 
Administration.41 According to 2009 census data, these 
governmental programs collectively cover approximately thirty-
one percent of the United States population.42 In other words, 
about one-third of the population has a statutory right to 
                                                          
 37. Social Security Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-384, 80 Stat. 99, 99–106 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006)); Pub. L. No. 110-27, 121 Stat. 111 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 426 (2006)); Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 119–
1024 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395rr-1 (2006)) (providing Medicare coverage 
and medical screening services to individuals exposed to environmental health 
hazards as a result of a public health emergency declaration under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980 (CERCLA)). 
 38. Social Security Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2006). CHIP was created 
as part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4901, 111 
Stat. 251, 552 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa-1397jj); see also Children’s 
Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-3, 
123 Stat. 8 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) 
(financing CHIP through 2013). 
 39. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r-1. 
 40. 10 U.S.C. §§1071–1110 (2006). 
 41. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1710(a), 1722(a) (2006). 
 42. Table HI05. Health Insurance Coverage Status and Type of Coverage 
by State and Age for All People: 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032010/health/h05_000.htm (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2012) [hereinafter Insurance Coverage Status]. 
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health care from one of these government programs. An 
additional fifty-two percent of the population is covered 
through some form of private insurance, whether employer-
based or direct-purchased.43 As of 2009, the approximate 
remaining seventeen percent of the population (50,674,000 
persons) were uninsured.44 
The statutory language of these benefit programs provides 
the right to health care for covered individuals by either (1) 
creating the benefit program and providing that eligible 
individuals are entitled to enroll or (2)  creating an obligation of 
third parties (such as state governments or private actors) to 
provide financing or services to eligible persons. For example, 
the Medicare statute creates a right by stating that every 
eligible individual “shall be entitled to hospital insurance 
benefits” under Medicare’s hospital benefits program (Part A) 
without having to pay hospital insurance premiums.45 All those 
who are enrolled in Medicare Part A are eligible to enroll in 
Part B,46 which covers non-hospital expenses such as 
physicians’ and outpatient services. The Medicaid statute 
requires state plans to provide “medical assistance” payments 
for covered medical services to all eligible persons.47 Under 
TRICARE’s statute, all members of a uniformed service are 
entitled to medical and dental care in any military facility.48 
                                                          
 43. Id. The 2009 census data report that sixty-four percent of the 
population has some form of private health insurance, but of these, 
approximately twelve also have government health insurance through 
Medicare or Medicaid. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 89-384 § 226 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
426 (2006)); Social Security Act § 226A. Medicare hospital benefits (Part A) are 
available without premiums to all those over age sixty-five who are eligible for 
Social Security. For those who are not eligible for Social Security benefits 
because, for example, they never worked or have never been married to 
someone who worked, Medicare is available but requires payment of 
premiums. For those who must pay premiums to obtain coverage, the statute 
states that all such persons “shall be eligible to enroll” in Medicare Part A. 
Social Security Act § 1818; Social Security Act § 1818A. 
 46. Social Security Act § 1836. 
 47. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)–(B) (2006). Eligible persons include those 
who fall into mandatory categories of eligibility (e.g., certain pregnant women 
and children) and other optional categories determined by the state. Medicaid 
also contains a nondiscrimination requirement that the medical assistance 
provided to one person “shall not be less in amount, duration, or scope than 
the medical assistance made available to any other such individual . . . .” 42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)–(B). 
 48. 10 U.S.C. § 1074(a)(1) (2006). Dependents of members of the 
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EMTALA creates a right to emergency health care for 
persons with an emergency medical condition, regardless of the 
patient’s ability to pay.49 EMTALA embodies the non-
excludable nature of the right to health care, because 
emergency care must be provided to anyone who shows up to 
an emergency room with an emergency medical condition in 
hospitals participating in Medicare. The right, however, is 
limited in scope because it only requires hospitals to provide 
enough care to stabilize a person’s emergency condition50 and 
thus falls short of even the most ungenerous conception of the 
minimum benefits package. It does not, for example, cover 
preventive care, primary care, prenatal care, care for chronic 
conditions, follow-up care, or tertiary care (such as surgery or 
invasive diagnostic tests) that are not necessary to stabilize the 
patient’s emergency medical condition. However, for the 
uninsured, the right to emergency medical care is the only right 
to health care universally available, which may, in part, 
explain why care is increasingly sought in emergency rooms in 
the United States.51 Unlike the federal benefit programs, 
EMTALA does not create a government-funded health care 
program or state that all individuals have a right to emergency 
medical care that the government will pay for or provide. 
Instead, it requires that hospitals, as a condition of 
participating in Medicare, provide emergency care in a 
nondiscriminatory manner to all who present at their 
                                                          
uniformed services are also covered under TRICARE, but the statutory 
language granting them access is weaker, requiring that the Secretary of 
Defense to contract with managed care or other health plans to provide 
medical and dental services for military members’ dependents, but only to the 
extent that the Secretary considers appropriate. 10 U.S.C. § 1079(a). 
 49. Emergency Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. An 
“emergency medical condition” is defined as: 
[A] medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of 
sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of 
immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in 
(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant 
woman, the health of the woman or her unborn child) in serious 
jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (iii) serious 
dysfunction of any bodily organ or part . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A). 
 50. Id. § 1395dd(b)–(c) (2006). 
 51. See Menzel, supra note 18, at 84; Stephen R. Pitts et al., Where 
Americans Get Acute Care: Increasingly, It’s Not at Their Doctor’s Office, 29 
HEALTH AFF. 1620,1624–25 (2010). 
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emergency room.52 
C. THE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE 
ACT 
This patchwork of federal programs discussed above 
provides a statutory right to health care for certain subgroups 
of the population. These programs, however, leave uncovered 
approximately 43 million uninsured working-age adults and 7.5 
million uninsured children.53 Congress responded to this 
growing population of uninsured by creating a health insurance 
coverage scheme to accomplish near-universal coverage for 
those without health insurance. The ACA contains several 
provisions that, when considered together, create a statutory 
right to health care for the population not eligible for an 
existing federal benefit program nor covered through employer-
sponsored or other private insurance.54 However, an 
affirmative statement that all Americans have a right to health 
care is nowhere to be found in the ACA. 
The right to health care under the ACA is different than 
the other federal statutory rights because it does not create a 
government program to provide health care or health 
insurance. Other than a significant (now optional) expansion of 
Medicaid,55 Congress declined to structure the right to health 
                                                          
 52. Emergency Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. 
 53. Insurance Coverage Status, supra note 42. 
 54. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010). 
 55. The right to health care accomplished through expansion of Medicaid 
to nearly all persons up 133% of the federal poverty level was originally 
estimated to account for about half of the 32 million of those of those to be 
newly insured under the ACA. The other half are covered through the right to 
health care accomplished through the private insurance reform provisions 
discussed in this Part I. After the Supreme Court ruled that the expansion 
must be optional to states to be constitutional, it is unclear how many of the 
states will opt-out of the expansion, leaving much of their population of poor 
uninsured. Following the ruling, the Congressional Budget Office estimated 
that 6 million fewer individuals will be covered by Medicaid because their 
states opt out of the expansion. Of those, 3 million will obtain coverage 
through the Exchanges, leaving a net of 3 million additional uninsured as a 
result of the Supreme Court’s decision. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES 
FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION (2012), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43472-07-24-2012-
CoverageEstimates.pdf; see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No. 11–
393, slip op. (U.S. June 28, 2012); Letter from Peter Elmendorf, Director, 
Cong. Budget Office, to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 
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care in the ACA through governmental provision of health care 
or health insurance when the so-called “public option” was 
defeated in earlier versions of the bill.56 Thus, unlike the 
statutory language establishing an entitlement to health care 
or health insurance under Medicare, Medicaid, or other federal 
programs, the right to health care in the ACA is derived from a 
combination of nondiscrimination and guaranteed issue 
provisions applicable to private health insurers and the 
creation of an accessible private health insurance market. The 
choice to structure the right this way had the political 
advantage of expanding existing private markets, and it relies 
on competing private actors and the states to administer health 
care coverage in a meaningful and cost-effective manner. 
The health insurance nondiscrimination portions of the 
right to health care are designed to prohibit health plans from 
engaging in practices that have previously barred individuals 
from obtaining coverage, such as denying coverage for 
preexisting health conditions or prior medical history, charging 
higher premiums based on gender or age, or finding technical 
reason to rescind coverage when a person develops a health 
condition.57 Health insurance companies employ these 
                                                          
(Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ 
attachments/hr4872_0.pdf [hereinafter, CBO Estimate]; John V. Jacobi, 
Sidney D. Watson & Robert Restuccia, Implementing Health Reform at the 
State Level: Access and Care for Vulnerable Populations. 39 J.L. MED. ETHICS 
(special supplement) 69, 69 (2011). 
 56. Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (enacted); see also Robert Pear & Jackie Calmes, Senators Battle Over 
Two Public Insurance Proposals and Reject Both, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2009, 
at A18. 
 57. H.R. 3962 §§ 1001, 1201 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2006)) (going 
into effect January 1, 2014 and prohibiting health plans in the group and 
individual markets from: (1) excluding persons from coverage on the basis of a 
preexisting condition; (2) setting eligibility rules based on health status, 
medical condition, claims experience, receipt of health care, medical history, 
genetic information, evidence of insurability, disability or other health status-
related factors determined by the Secretary of the Department of HHS; (3) 
engaging in discriminatory premium pricing; and, (4) except for individual 
health plans, imposing waiting periods for coverage in excess of ninety days). 
See S. REP. NO. 111-89, at 3–4 (2009) (“For the millions of Americans who 
don’t have employer-sponsored coverage, cannot afford to purchase coverage 
on their own, or who are denied coverage by health insurance companies due 
to a pre-existing condition, the [bill] reforms the individual and small-group 
markets, making health coverage affordable and accessible. These market 
reforms would require insurance companies to issue coverage to all individuals 
regardless of health status, prohibit insurers from limiting coverage based on 
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underwriting practices to avoid higher-risk and higher-cost 
beneficiaries.58 As a result, an individual with an existing 
health condition or unfavorable medical history may find she is 
unable to qualify for a health insurance policy or one that is 
affordable.59 Or she may lose coverage for medical expenses if 
she hits an annual or lifetime cost-limit imposed by the plan or 
find herself terminated from coverage following the 
development of a high-cost condition, such as breast cancer.60 
In addition, the ACA’s guaranteed issue provisions require 
health plans to accept every employer or individual in the state 
that applies for coverage and offer the essential benefits 
package, so all persons will have access to basic, comprehensive 
health insurance.61 
The ACA’s nondiscrimination and guaranteed issue 
provisions remove blockades to accessing health insurance by 
forcing health plans to accept all prospective consumers and 
engage in fair pricing and underwriting practices regardless of 
health status, gender, or genetic predisposition. Removing 
roadblocks only establishes part of the right to health care. The 
right would remain relatively empty without affordable health 
insurance products available to those for whom coverage was 
                                                          
pre-existing conditions and allow only limited variation in premium rates.”). 
 58. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No. 11–393, slip op. at 9–10 
(U.S. June 28, 2012) (Ginburg, J., dissenting) (“Because individuals with 
preexisting medical conditions cost insurance companies significantly more 
than those without such conditions, insurers routinely refused to insure these 
individuals, charged them substantially higher premiums, or offered only 
limited coverage that did not include the preexisting illness.”); SUSAN JAFFE, 
HEALTH AFF., HEALTH INSURANCE REFORMS: SHOULD THERE BE A NEW 
FEDERAL LAW AND REGULATIONS TO BROADEN COVERAGE AND MAKE THE 
MARKET WORK BETTER FOR INDIVIDUALS AND SMALL BUSINESSES? (2009), 
available at http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/ 
healthpolicybrief_12.pdf. 
 59. See, e.g., David Hilzenrath, Acne, Pregnancy Among Disqualifying 
Conditions, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2009, at A3. 
 60. Christopher Lee, More Hitting Cost Limit on Health Benefits: 
Consumers Forced To Explore Options, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2008, at A3; 
Murray Waas, WellPoint Routinely Targets Breast Cancer Patients, REUTERS 
(Apr. 23, 2010, 7:28 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/23/us-
wellpoint-breastcancer-idUSTRE63M5D420100423. 
 61. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 
1201, 124 Stat. 119, 183–84 (2010). Section 1201 also imposes affirmative 
requirements on individual and group health plans to accept every employer 
or individual in the state that applies for coverage; guarantee renewability of 
coverage in the individual and group markets (other than self-insured group 
plans); for all small group and individual plans, provide the essential benefits 
package; and, for all group plans, meet cost-sharing limits requirements. 
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previously beyond reach. This accessible health insurance 
market is achieved through the creation of state-based health 
insurance exchanges (Exchanges) and through subsidies for 
those unable to afford coverage.62 Health insurance exchanges 
are state-based marketplaces for “qualified health plans” that 
offer the essential benefits package and meet affordability and 
consumer protection requirements (including the 
nondiscrimination and guaranteed issue requirements) for 
qualified individuals and employers to compare information 
and purchase health insurance.63 For those who cannot afford 
to purchase health insurance from the Exchange but make too 
much income to qualify for Medicaid, the ACA offers individual 
subsidies for those earning up to 400 percent of the federal 
poverty level.64 
The role premium subsidies play in actualizing the right to 
health care is highlighted by a strange outcome of the Supreme 
Court’s ACA decision. The decision creates a hole in the right to 
health care for those persons who would have been newly 
eligible for Medicaid under the expanded program, but whose 
state declines to pursue the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. 
Pursuant to the Court’s ruling, states may opt out of the 
Medicaid expansion to cover all non-retired persons up to 133% 
of the federal poverty level without forfeiting the federal dollars 
                                                          
 62. Id. § 1311 (creating health insurance exchanges) and § 1401 
(providing for premium subsidies for individuals to purchase health 
insurance). 
 63. Id. § 1311–12. A “qualified individual” is defined as an individual who 
(1) is seeking to enroll in a qualified health plan in the individual market 
offered through the Exchange, (2) is a citizen or lawful resident of the United 
States, and (3) resides in the state that established the Exchange (other than 
incarcerated individuals). Qualified employers initially include only small 
employers with fewer than 100 employees that elect to offer Exchange-based 
qualified health plans to full time employees, but expand to large employers 
after 2017. Id. 
 64. Id. § 1401, amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act 
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1001 [hereinafter HCERA]. The sliding-scale 
subsidies take the form of refundable tax credits for premium costs and limits 
to cost-sharing amounts and are designed to limit an individual’s out-of-pocket 
expenses to affordable levels, ranging from 2 percent for individuals with 
income up to 133 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) to 9.5 percent for 
those at 400 percent of FPL. See S. REP. NO. 111-89, at 4 (2009) (“To ensure 
that health coverage is affordable, the [bill] would provide an advanceable, 
refundable tax credit for low and middle-income individuals (between 100–400 
percent of FPL) to help offset the cost of private health insurance premiums”). 
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that help fund the state’s existing Medicaid program.65 If, 
however, a state opts-out of Medicaid, no premium subsidies 
would be available for those who are not eligible for Medicaid, 
such as childless adults, and who earn less than 100% of the 
federal poverty level, almost ensuring that these individuals 
would be left uninsured.66 
To the extent that remedies are intrinsic to the existence of 
a right, the ACA’s right to health care, specifically the 
nondiscrimination provisions applicable to insurance plans are 
enforceable by individuals through federal regulations setting 
forth requirements for appeals of adverse health plan decisions 
and actions.67 If a health plan fails to meet the federal 
requirements for the appeals process, the claimant may 
immediately seek judicial review.68 What is less apparent is 
whether individuals seeking to purchase a health plan on the 
Exchanges have a remedy if their state does properly 
administer an Exchange or if no affordable health plans are 
offered in the Exchange. Such individuals, if they fall under 
400% of the federal poverty limit, may be protected to some 
degree by availability of the subsidies to make purchase of 
health plans affordable.69 
The closest the ACA comes to affirmatively recognizing a 
right to health care is set forth in section 1312 of the ACA, 
which provides, “A qualified individual may enroll in any 
qualified health plan available to such individual and for which 
such individual is eligible.”70 On its face, this right appears to 
be limited by health plan availability and individual eligibility. 
                                                          
 65. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No. 11–393, slip op. at 50 
(U.S. June 28, 2012). 
 66. See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, What Happens if a State Opts Out of Medicaid, 
In One Chart, WASH. POST WONK BLOG (July 5, 2012, 10:25 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/07/05/what-happens-
if-a-state-opts-out-of-medicaid-in-one-chart/. 
 67. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 
1401, 124 Stat. 119, 213-20 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1001; Interim Final Rules 
for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Internal 
Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 43330, 43334 (July 23, 2010) 
(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 54 and 602, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. 
pt. 147). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See supra note 64. 
 70. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 
1312, 124 Stat. 119, 182–84, amended by § 10104(i)(I). 
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The modifier “for which such individual is eligible” does not 
appear to create additional limitations because qualified 
individuals are, by definition, “qualified” and thus eligible to 
purchase health insurance made available in their own state 
Exchange.71 Qualified health plans must issue health insurance 
policies to any individual in the state who applies. Thus, a 
qualified individual arguably has a statutory right to obtain 
health insurance from a qualified health plan in their state 
Exchange. The availability of health plans may, however, pose 
a limitation. Health insurers are not required to offer qualified 
health plans in the Exchanges. It is assumed that health 
insurers will want to participate in this new market, which 
largely replaces and expands the individual and small group 
insurance markets currently in existence. There is, however, no 
guarantee that sufficient options will be offered by health plans 
in the Exchanges. 
Taken together, these health insurance reforms create a 
negative right to health care—the right to be free from 
discrimination on the basis of health status when seeking 
coverage.  The ACA’s right to health care is available for most, 
but not all, of the uninsured72 by providing non-excludable 
access to all individuals who seek to purchase health insurance, 
creating a market for these health insurance products, and 
subsidizing the costs of premiums for those who cannot afford 
coverage. Unlike the Medicare, VA or TRICARE programs, the 
federal government is not in charge of financing or 
administering the health care services to which eligible persons 
are entitled. The right is instead more akin to the right to 
emergency care under EMTALA, creating an affirmative 
obligation for private actors to provide coverage or care to all 
who need services. As with EMTALA, when government is not 
itself paying for or providing the health care, the right to health 
                                                          
 71. See supra note 63 for the definition of a “qualified individual”. 
 72. The uninsured are those who are not covered by existing federal 
health care programs, employer-based or other private health insurance. Note, 
however, certain uninsured persons are left out of the ACA’s right to health 
care: illegal immigrants are not eligible for Medicaid or premium subsidies for 
the purchase of private insurance through the Exchanges. After the Supreme 
Court’s decision, poor adults and others who make less than 100% of the 
federal poverty level will not be eligible for premium subsidies because 
Congress believed they would be covered by the expanded Medicaid program. 
Such individuals in states that opt out of the Medicaid expansion will continue 
to be uninsured. 
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care is structured in terms of imposing obligations on private 
entities to accept all comers. 
II. DURABILITY OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S 
RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE 
The ACA follows a line of statutes providing health care 
coverage to an increasing proportion of the population. In 
addition to health care benefits for the aged, disabled, certain 
poor, members of the military, and veterans, the question 
remains whether Americans will similarly embrace extending 
such a right to the uninsured. The problem with the ACA’s 
right to health care for the uninsured is that it is structured in 
a way that weakens its prospects for durability. This part 
explores what makes a right durable, drawing on and 
expanding upon the sub-constitutionalism literature and theory 
of superstatutes to add a new category called “quasi-
superstatutes” to capture those that aspire to be, but fail to 
achieve the entrenchment and social change required to become 
a superstatute. 
A. USING SUPERSTATUTES TO CREATE DURABLE STATUTORY 
RIGHTS 
Durable rights are rights that the public accepts as 
fundamental legal norms for society and thus persist over time 
without deterioration. Their widespread acceptance by the 
public makes them resistant to erosion or political attack when 
honoring the right is difficult, such as in challenging economic 
circumstances or when the right is applied to an unpopular 
group. A quintessential example of a durable right is the right 
to freedom of speech. The right is accepted as a fundamental 
norm for society’s functioning, so the right remains protected 
even when the speech involves deeply offensive and unpopular 
speech.73 This type of entrenchment makes a right durable and 
allows individuals to be able to count on the protection of and 
benefits of the right over time. Although constitutional rights 
are the traditional examples of durable rights, entrenched 
through the difficult Article V amendment process and 
constitutional supremacy, many of the positive rights in this 
country are created via statute rather than the Constitution. 
                                                          
 73. See e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1218–19 (2011) (upholding 
the First Amendment right of members of the Westboro Baptist Church to 
protest at military funerals). 
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According to a growing body of literature that can be 
referred to collectively as “sub-constitutionalism,” it is 
unsurprising that the right to health care in this country would 
be accomplished via statute rather than through the 
Constitution. According to this account, many of the laws that 
create important legal norms in this country exist largely 
outside the four corners of the Constitution.74 Rather, many of 
the functions usually thought to be of a “constitutional” nature, 
specifically the establishment of individual rights and 
governmental institutions, are accomplished through sub-
constitutional laws.75 The inflexibility and structural 
limitations of the Constitution drive Americans to utilize 
statutes to articulate and protect most of the positive rights 
that are guaranteed by law.76 
The problem with statutory rights is that they do not 
automatically come with the political protection and structural 
entrenchment that endow constitutional rights. Even if 
legislators muster the political will to create a new right, more 
is required to make it durable. Here, the sub-constitutional 
theory of superstatutes is useful because the same features 
                                                          
 74. A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8; Bruce Ackerman, The Living 
Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1741 (2007); Ernest A. Young, The 
Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 410 (2007); Eskridge 
& Ferejohn, supra note 9, at 1215; Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an 
Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1934); see also, Preis, supra note 35. 
 75. A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 1, 7 (“Some of the nation’s 
entrenched governance structures and normative commitments are derived 
directly from the Constitution, but most are found in superstatutes enacted by 
Congress, executive-legislative partnerships, and consensus of state 
legislature.”); Young, supra note 74, at 416 (citing society’s commitments to 
environmental stewardship, intergenerational responsibility, and free market 
economy as embodied by statutes such the Clean Water Act, Social Security 
and Medicare regimes, and the Sherman Antitrust Act, rather than the 
Constitution); see also Preis, supra note 35, at 1663 (arguing that enforcement 
of constitutional norms often occurs by proxy through sub-constitutional 
statutes that elaborate on constitutional guarantees). 
 76. A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 25 (describing the 
weaknesses of the Constitution that explain the rise of sub-constitutional law: 
first, the Constitution is old and difficult to amend making it rigid and non-
adaptive to changing norms and social problems; second, the Constitution’s 
largely structural and process-orientation limits its ability to respond to the 
substantive values and commitments important to the polity; third the 
Constitution primarily addresses state actors and says little to nonpublic 
sources of authority and power); Young, supra note 74, at 424 (“[M]any rights 
that are fundamental for individuals in modern America are entirely creatures 
of statute.”). 
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that make a statute “super” will also make a statutory right 
durable. 
Statutory rights can be durable because they are contained 
within entrenched superstatutes. According to Eskridge and 
Ferejohn, a superstatute is a relatively rare breed of statute 
that is similar to, and shares the work of, constitutions—by 
articulating fundamental legal norms that become so embraced 
by both public and institutional culture that they become 
“deeply embedded in our national aspirations.”77 Examples of 
superstatutes that have provided individual rights include: the 
Social Security Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Voting 
Rights Act, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.78 
Three features distinguish superstatutes from ordinary 
statutes.79 The statute: (1) embodies a new principle or policy 
that displaces common law baselines and responds to 
important social or economic challenges facing the country; (2) 
is enacted after a process of publicized institutional 
deliberation; and (3) sticks in the public culture, after a period 
of implementation and formal confirmation by Congress after 
further public discussion.80 The first two features of 
superstatutes align with Bruce Ackerman’s concept of a 
“constitutional moment,” which describes the particular 
confluence of a strong social movement and public deliberation 
to address a particular injustice or problem in a way that 
establishes new fundamental legal norms.81 The involvement of 
the public and the underlying effort to address social problems 
give superstatutes weight and legitimacy beyond ordinary 
statutes.82 Nevertheless, the third feature, entrenchment 
through public support, is the most salient feature of 
                                                          
 77. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 9, at 1273. Cf. Ackerman, supra note 
74, at 1742 (describing the role of “landmark statutes” such as the Social 
Security Act in transforming constitutional norms). 
 78. See Ackerman, supra note 74, at 1742. 
 79. A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 26. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Ackerman, supra note 74, at 1765. 
 82. See A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 27–28. Ordinary 
statutes may become entrenched, but because they do not address an 
important social problem or lack public deliberation, they do not express the 
fundamental values of society the way superstatutes do. For example, statutes 
like ERISA or certain provisions of the tax code may be entrenched through 
institutional inertia and political capture by certain interest groups, but such 
entrenchment alone, without the public engagement and normative objectives, 
may not classify such statutes as superstatutes. 
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superstatutes. 
The type of entrenchment statutes achieve is a functional 
entrenchment that occurs when a legal norm has widespread 
popular support across an array of interests that makes it 
resistant to political challenge.83 Unlike the “formal” 
entrenchment process required by Article V of the Constitution, 
where difficult procedural hurdles tie the hands of future 
policymakers, popular support of superstatutes leads to 
entrenchment through reaffirmation, continued expansion, 
implementation, and refinement by subsequent legislatures, 
executive agencies, and courts.84 To achieve the strong 
constituency of support necessary for functional entrenchment, 
implementation of the statute must overcome the challenges 
predicted by the statute’s critics and deliver sufficient value to 
a politically significant and growing group of the population.85 
As a result, functionally entrenched statutory rights may be 
just as important to Americans as certain formally entrenched 
constitutional rights.86 
One weakness of the superstatute theory is that the 
application of the superstatute criteria does not predict at the 
outset whether a particular statute will become a superstatute. 
Thus, it is not certain whether the rights created by the statute 
will ever become durable rights until the statute has stood the 
test of time.87 Although this article does not purport to solve 
this theoretical vacuum, it does assume that the optimal way to 
forecast the fate of a would-be superstatute is to look to the 
features of a statute that make it more or less likely to become 
entrenched. These features of entrenchment include not only 
the breadth of public support the statute has amassed upon 
passage, but the ability of the statute to effectively deliver 
tangible benefits to a wide swath of constituents while 
garnering support from its opponents.88 
                                                          
 83. See id. at 13; Young, supra note 74, at 458. 
 84. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 9, at 1230–31. 
 85. A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 17. 
 86. See Young, supra note 74, at 412. 
 87. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 9, at 1273 (“One test of a super-
statute is that whatever the circumstances of its enactment, it instantiates a 
principle that passes the test of time: it works, it appeals to multiple 
generations, and it sticks in the public culture.”). 
 88. See A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 28. 
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B. THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S FRAGILE RIGHT TO HEALTH 
CARE 
The ACA is a statute that aspires to be a superstatute. 
Nevertheless, the right to health care for the uninsured created 
by the ACA is structured in a way that weakens its prospects 
for durability. The ACA differs in significant ways from other 
federal statutory rights to health care that have become 
entrenched. The ACA’s right relies upon reformation and 
creation of a private health insurance market for the uninsured 
rather than a government-administered and funded program. 
The ACA’s vulnerabilities are revealed when compared to 
Medicare. 
In the health care context, Medicare is a primary example 
of a durable right created by a superstatute. Like most 
superstatutes, Medicare addresses an important social 
problem.89 Prior to its passage, most of the increasing 
population of persons over age sixty-five lacked health 
insurance and consequently were at risk for destitution, 
increased infirmity, or even premature death.90 The New York 
Times reported that by 1960 the question of medical insurance 
for persons sixty-five years of age and older had become one of 
the hottest political issues in the nation.91 The passage of 
Medicare changed the existing baseline by extending federally 
administered health care coverage to all persons over sixty-five 
years of age.92 Similarly, the ACA addresses the pressing social 
and economic problem that over fifty million nonelderly 
Americans are uninsured.93 The push to cover these uninsured 
and reform the health care system became the most pressing 
political issue in the 2008 election.94 Nearly fifty years after 
Congress created Medicare, the New York Times reported that 
“five months after [President Obama’s] inauguration, health 
care dominates the domestic agenda on both ends of 
                                                          
 89. See id. at 26 (discussing how superstatutes address important social 
or economic problems). 
 90. See SHERI I. DAVID, WITH DIGNITY, THE SEARCH FOR MEDICARE AND 
MEDICAID 5 (1985) (discussing a 1959 finding that only forty-three percent of 
senior citizens had any hospital or health policy). 
 91. See Edwin L. Dale Jr., Congress Facing Issues Renewing Battle of 
Budget, N.Y. TIMES, April 11, 1960, at 1. 
 92. See A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 197–98. 
 93. See KAISER COMMISSION, MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED 1–2 (2012), 
available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/1420-14.pdf. 
 94. See KAISER FAM. FOUND., HEALTH CARE AND THE 2008 ELECTIONS 1–4 
(2008), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7813.pdf. 
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Pennsylvania Avenue.”95 
Moreover, the legislation establishing Medicare followed a 
period of extensive public and political deliberation. In the five 
years prior to Medicare’s passage in 1965, both Presidents 
Kennedy and Johnson had repeatedly championed several of 
Medicare’s unsuccessful predecessors.96 Efforts to provide 
health care coverage for the elderly date back even earlier, to 
the origins of the Social Security Act itself.97 As with the 
problem of covering the elderly that led to the passage of 
Medicare, public debate over health reform and the problem of 
the uninsured has persisted for decades.98 Several 
administrations and Congresses have tried unsuccessfully to 
extend coverage to the uninsured and reign in health care 
costs.99 The most recent attempt, President Clinton’s Health 
Security Act, would have accomplished near-universal coverage 
through a combination of individual and employer mandates, 
“managed competition” between health plans, and increased 
government regulation.100 
A significant difference between the ACA and Medicare, 
however, is the degree of public support critical for 
entrenchment and durability. The ACA’s capacity to attract 
public support differs not only when measured at the time of 
passage, but more importantly, in the way the right to health 
care is structured to attract widespread support and overcome 
its opponents in the critical period following passage. The 
ACA’s right has several vulnerabilities that may prevent its 
right to health care from garnering broad public support.101 The 
vulnerabilities stem from the structure of the ACA’s right to 
                                                          
 95. Kevin Sack, Health Care Reform’s Moment Arrives (Again), N.Y. 
TIMES, June 19, 2009, at A17. 
 96. See DAVID, supra note 90, at 121; LAWRENCE R. JACOBS, THE HEALTH 
OF NATIONS: PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN AND BRITISH 
HEALTH POLICY 190 (1993). 
 97. See A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 197. 
 98. See Lee Igel, The History of Health Care as a Campaign Issue, 
PHYSICIAN EXECUTIVE J. MED. MGMT., June 12, 2008, at 12. 
 99. See id. at 14 (discussing health care attempts under the Nixon 
administration). 
 100. Cf. Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1993). 
 101. See, e.g., Ramesh Ponnuru, The Flaws that Will Bring Down Obama’s 
Health Care Plan, BLOOMBERG.COM (Oct. 1, 2012, 5:30 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-01/the-flaws-that-will-bring-down-
obama-s-health-care-plan.html. 
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health care, not as a publicly administered benefit program, 
but rather, from private health insurance market reforms. The 
ACA’s challenges fall into three related categories: (1) political 
challenges; (2) legal challenges; and (3) market challenges. 
1. Political Challenges 
Significant political challenges to major social reforms are 
not unique. Most superstatutes, including Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act and Medicare, faced significant political opposition 
in their early years after passage.102 But public opinion often 
drives political opinion, so that if a law does not provide enough 
of a tangible benefit before the next election, political 
opposition to new legislation or its implementation may not be 
checked by rising public support. 
Public support leading up to and following the passage of 
Medicare appears to have been strong.103 Although Medicare 
initially had strong opponents, namely in the American 
Medical Association, opposition among the medical community 
dwindled following Medicare’s passage.104 The medical 
community’s opposition was tempered by significant regulatory 
concessions in the form of generous increases in reimbursement 
rates that led these opponents to see Medicare as a lucrative 
source of new business.105 With the major bloc of opponents 
disarmed, Medicare’s beneficiaries began enjoying its benefits 
soon thereafter. Medicare was signed into law on July 31, 1965 
and the program began paying for hospital insurance benefits 
(Part A) on July 1, 1966 and nursing home and physicians’ 
                                                          
 102. See DAVID, supra note 90, at 11–12 (describing political opposition to 
Medicare); Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political 
Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1452–54 (2003) (describing 
opposition to the expansion of federal civil rights among a large group of 
legislators from the South); see also ROBERT D. LOEVY, TO END ALL 
SEGREGATION: THE POLITICS OF THE PASSAGE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 
1964 153–224, 287–314 (1990). 
 103. See Julie Ray, The Gallup Brain: Medicare’s Early Days, GALLUP 
(May 27, 2003), http://www.gallup.com/poll/8491/gallup-brain-medicares-early-
days.aspx (finding that in 1964, sixty-one percent of Americans approved of 
Medicare, thirty-one percent disapproved and eight percent did not know); see 
also Andrew Kohut, Would Americans Welcome Medicare if it Were Being 
Proposed in 2009?, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Aug. 19, 2009), 
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1317/would-americans-welcome-medicare-if-
proposed-in-2009. 
 104. See DAVID, supra note 90, at 11–12. 
 105. See id. at 150–51. 
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payments (Part B) on January 1, 1967.106 Because participation 
in Part B is voluntary, the Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare—the precursor to the Department of Health and 
Human Services—engaged in an intensive advertising 
campaign to explain the Part B program to seniors across the 
country.107 The Department’s advertising campaign was a great 
success and achieved enrollment of ninety-five percent of the 
eligible seniors in Part B within a year of Medicare’s 
passage.108 In subsequent years, both Democratic- and 
Republican-controlled Congresses expanded Medicare to 
include coverage for ambulatory surgery services, prescription 
drugs, private managed care plans, and additional classes of 
eligibility.109 Even as the baby boomer generation begins to 
qualify for Medicare and strain Medicare’s fiscal viability, 
Medicare remains politically strong, and elected officials from 
both parties who seek to curtail the program do so at their 
peril.110 Like Social Security, its parent program, Medicare has 
become fixed in the public’s mind as an essential means to 
assure economic and medical security in old age, to which 
Americans feel entitled and value as a fundamental social good 
for society.111 
                                                          
 106. Id. at 144. 
 107. Id. at 146 (explaining that the department published approximately 
twenty-million informational kits in twenty-two languages, delivered in some 
areas by horse or dogsled). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act 
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 101, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (creating Medicare 
Part D which expanded coverage to prescription drugs); Balanced Budget Act 
of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4001, 111 Stat. 251 (1997) (creating Medicare 
Part C which expanded coverage to managed care); Social Security 
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (1972) (expanding 
eligibility to individuals under 65 with longterm disabilities and individuals 
with endstage renal disease). 
 110. See Peter H. Schuck, The Golden Age of Aging and Its Discontents, 18 
ELDER L.J. 25, 40 (2010) (“This political entrenchment and inertia are even 
more pronounced today because both political parties, desperate for senior 
votes, are competing to be perceived as the most stalwart and unequivocal 
defenders of the current Medicare program.”); see also Raymond Hernandez, 
Gaining Upset, Democrat Wins New York Seat, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2011, at 
A1 (providing as a recent example of the strength of Medicare’s persistent 
political support the electoral upset of a GOP House candidate attributed to 
Congressman Paul Ryan’s fiscal year 2012 budget plan to transform Medicare 
from a comprehensive public benefit program to a private, fixed cost voucher 
system). 
 111. See Young, supra note 74, at 424–25. 
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By contrast, when the ACA passed, public opinion was 
mixed.112 This reaction may be due, in part, to the persisting 
confusion about the complex content of the ACA and its 
potential impact on the public.113 Politically, the right to health 
care under the ACA faces more formidable opposition than 
Medicare. Although the ACA was backed by the American 
Medical Association, not one Republican voted for the Act.114 In 
this way, the ACA was perhaps more like the Civil Rights Act, 
which passed amidst bitter partisan division.115 A year and a 
half after passage, the already divided public support for the 
ACA continued to wane as the percentage of individuals who 
believed the ACA would make no difference for them 
increased.116 The major opponents of the ACA may not be 
swayed by an administrative compromise, such as the favorable 
reimbursement rates that won the medical community’s 
support for Medicare. The opponents of the ACA focused less on 
the practicalities of its effect on their business or income, but 
rather on a more fundamental opposition to a government 
mandate for individual participation in the health care 
market.117 
Although millions stand to benefit from the ACA’s coverage 
provisions, most of these provisions do not go into effect until 
                                                          
 112. KAISER FAM. FOUND., KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL 4 (Mar. 2012), 
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/8285-F.pdf (finding that at the time of 
passage, forty-six percent of the public had a favorable view, forty percent had 
an unfavorable view, and fourteen percent did not know); Lydia Saad, By Slim 
Margin Americans Support Healthcare Bill’s Passage, GALLUP (Mar. 23, 2010), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/126929/Slim-Margin-Americans-Support-
Healthcare-Bill-Passage.aspx (finding that on the day after the ACA’s passage, 
49% of national adults polled reported that the passage was a “good thing,” 
40% reported it was a “bad thing,” and 11% did not know). 
 113. KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL, supra note 112 (finding that fifty-
two percent of the public do not feel they have adequate information to 
understand how the law will affect them). 
 114. David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Democrats Rally to Obama’s 
Call for Health Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2010, at A16. 
 115. Rep. James Clyburn (D-S.C.), in describing the ACA, said, “This is the 
Civil Rights Act of the 21st century.” Id. 
 116. KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL, supra note 112 (finding that as of 
March 2012, two years after passage, 40% of the public had a unfavorable 
opinion, 41% percent had a favorable opinion, and 19% did not know, and the 
percentage of individuals reporting that they do not have enough information 
to understand the ACA’s personal impact was 59%, virtually unchanged from 
fifty six percent in April 2010, immediately after the Act’s passage). 
 117. See, e.g., Rep. Lamar Smith, Why I Am Voting to Repeal the New 
Health Care Law, FOX NEWS (Jan. 19, 2011), www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/ 
01/19/rep-lamar-smith-voting-repeal-new-health-care-law/. 
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January 2014, nearly four years after the passage of the Act 
and two years after the presidential and congressional elections 
of 2012. Unlike the seniors who started receiving Medicare 
benefits within a year of its passage, the uninsured persons 
who stand to benefit most from the ACA’s right to health care 
remain confused about its amalgam of benefits and 
requirements more than a year after the ACA’s passage.118 
Finally, Medicare was supported by seniors, a cohesive 
political group, that had coalesced into a powerful identity 
group following the passage of the Social Security Act and 
under the leadership of the AARP.119 The uninsured, by 
contrast, do not make up a similarly stable or organized 
political force. Although an estimated eighteen million will gain 
insurance through the private insurance reforms,120 the group 
itself may be somewhat fluid as people move between employer-
based coverage, coverage through the Exchanges, and coverage 
through government programs such as Medicaid. Moreover, 
Medicare’s positive entitlement as a valuable government 
program is easy for its beneficiaries to understand and defend. 
In contrast, the features of the ACA’s right to health care, such 
as tax credit subsidies, underwriting reforms, and state-based 
Exchanges, may appear to beneficiaries less like a tangible 
benefit and more like an amorphous array of private insurance 
market rules. The ACA’s negative right to health care may thus 
fail to inspire the sort of identity-politics that can powerfully 
advocate for the ACA’s continued survival.121 
                                                          
 118. Drew Altman, Uninsured But Not Yet Informed, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 
(Aug. 2011), http://www.kff.org/pullingittogether/uninsured_informed_ 
altman.cfm (finding in August 2011 Kaiser Health Tracking Poll that 47% of 
uninsured adults 18–64 believed that the health reform law will not make 
much difference to them, fourteen percent believed it would hurt them, and 
seven percent did not know). 
 119. See ANDREA CAMPBELL, HOW POLICIES MAKE CITIZENS: SENIOR 
POLITICAL ACTIVISM AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 14–64 (2003) 
(outlining the development of senior citizens as a powerful voting 
demographic). 
 120. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE 
COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE 
RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION (2012), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43472-07-24-2012-
CoverageEstimates.pdf. 
 121. See Lawrence R. Jacobs, America’s Critical Juncture: The Affordable 
Care Act and Its Reverberations, 36 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 625, 630 (2011) 
(“[T]he ACA’s reliance on tax credits and decentralized mechanisms (such as 
state administration of health insurance exchanges) may well diminish its 
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2. Legal Challenges 
Almost as soon as it was passed, legal challenges to the 
ACA began. The foremost claim by challengers was that the so-
called individual mandate provision is unconstitutional because 
it exceeds Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce.122 
The individual mandate requires nearly all individuals to 
maintain minimum essential health insurance by 2014 or face 
civil penalties.123 In June 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that 
the individual mandate does exceed Congress’ powers under 
the Commerce Clause, but it upheld the mandate as a valid 
exercise of the taxing power.124 
The Supreme Court’s decision upholding the individual 
mandate preserves the right to health care deriving from 
insurance reforms.125 Although the creation of health insurance 
exchanges and health plan nondiscrimination provisions are 
not explicitly linked to or statutorily conditioned upon the 
individual mandate, they are economically intertwined.126 
Without the mandate, those who do not wish to purchase 
health insurance while healthy could wait until they needed 
care to purchase insurance.127 Because of the guaranteed issue 
                                                          
political effects. Not all government programs are transparent—or generous—
enough to create citizen interest groups in favor of the programs. Today’s tax 
exemptions for home mortgages and employer-sponsored health insurance, for 
example, are not recognized as government programs. Similarly, while the 
ACA makes health insurance more secure for all Americans, these protective 
provisions may not be enough to register with everyday citizens as tangible 
payoffs.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 122. See, e.g., Randy Barnett, A Noxious Commandment, N.Y. TIMES, (June 
26, 2012, 11:39 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/12/13/a-
fatal-blow-to-obamas-health-care-law/an-unconstitutional-commandment. 
 123. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-48, § 
1501(b), 124 Stat 242–49 (2010)) amended by § 10106 (b) and Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152 § 1002 (discussing 
exemptions from the mandate for religious objectors, individuals with incomes 
below the tax filing threshold, individuals for whom premiums would exceed 
eight percent of household income, and others). 
 124. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No. 11–393, slip op. at 39 (U.S. 
June 28, 2012) (“Our precedent demonstrates that Congress had the power to 
impose the exaction of §5000A under the taxing power . . . .”). 
 125. See id. at 6. 
 126. See id. at 53 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) 
(“The whole design of the Act is to balance the costs and benefits affecting 
each set of regulated parties. Thus, individuals are required to obtain health 
insurance . . . . States are expected to expand Medicaid eligibility and to create 
regulated marketplaces called exchanges where individuals can purchase 
insurance.”). 
 127. See id. at 11 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“[I]ndividuals can wait until 
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and nondiscrimination provisions, health plans cannot deny 
coverage or charge more to those who wait until they become 
sick to purchase health insurance.128 Such adverse selection 
would concentrate unhealthy, high-risk, and high-cost 
individuals in the health insurance exchanges, making the 
exchanges increasingly economically untenable to maintain.129 
Health plans would need to raise premiums to cover this sicker 
and riskier population without healthier persons to offset the 
costs of coverage.130 The higher premiums would cause more 
individuals to forego insurance and further concentrate sicker 
and riskier persons in the insurance pool: the insurance “death 
spiral.”131 As with all group insurance models, the low-utilizers’ 
inclusion in the insurance pool is necessary to subsidize the 
high-cost members.132 Given a broad enough pool, the risk to 
the insurer becomes more predictable and manageable.133 
During the two-year period that legal challenges to the 
ACA wound their way to the Supreme Court, there was a great 
deal of uncertainty among health insurance providers and 
states.134 These same actors must mobilize significant resources 
to implement the new health insurance market created by the 
ACA’s reforms. As of the day the Supreme Court’s decision was 
announced, the prediction markets had the odds of the Court 
striking down the individual mandate at about seventy-five 
percent.135 Even following the Court’s decision resolving the 
constitutional question, opponents continued to seek political 
                                                          
they become ill to buy insurance.”). 
 128. See id. at 17 (“Congress . . . acted reasonably in requiring uninsured 
individuals, whether sick or healthy, either to obtain insurance or to pay the 
specified penalty.”). 
 129. See id. at 11 (“This ‘adverse selection’ problem leaves insurers with 
two choices: They can . . . raise premiums dramatically to cover their ever-
increasing costs or they can exit the market.”). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 33. 
 132. See id. 
 133. Cf. Marc L. Berk & Alan C. Monheit, The Concentration of Health 
Care Expenditures Revisited, 20 HEALTH AFF. 9, 11 (2001). 
 134. Cf. Bob McConnell & Fred Upton, Obama Care’s Uncertainty Cripples 
States and Providers, INVESTORS.COM (Oct. 17, 2012, 6:49 PM), 
http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials-on-the-right/101712-629730-
obamacare-implementation-produces-unanswered-questions.htm?p=full. 
 135. See The U.S. Supreme Court to Rule the Individual Mandate 
Unconstitutional, INTRADE, http://www.intrade.com/v4/markets/contract/ 
?contractId=745353 (last visited Oct. 21, 2012). 
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overturn of the ACA.136 The legal challenge to the individual 
mandate, which economically undergirds the Act’s right to 
health care, created so much uncertainty that many states 
delayed taking legislative or administrative action to organize 
Exchanges.137 Insurance companies had been hedging their 
bets, both proceeding with implementation and bracing 
themselves for the possibility of rampant adverse selection, 
death spirals and state-shopping. Some postulated that without 
a federal mandate, health insurers would exit the market in 
states that did not impose a state-based mandate.138 
The legal uncertainty over the ACA’s health insurance 
reforms not only affected the parties required to implement the 
health insurance reforms, but it also undermined public 
confidence in the validity and durability of the right to health 
care. The legal challengers framed the discourse about the ACA 
as an infringement on individual rights, the right to be free 
from coerced purchase of unwanted health insurance 
products.139 This libertarian conceptualization of the individual 
mandate appears to have gained more traction in the public’s 
mind than the communitarian and more conceptually complex 
relationship between the mandate and the popular 
nondiscrimination provisions that make up the right to health 
care. 
Although the ACA’s right to health care survived its 
primary legal challenge, it was weakened by the uncertainty, 
implementation delay, and disapproving public discourse that 
proliferated while the legal issues were pending. 
3. Market Challenges 
The ACA’s right to health care depends upon the collective 
action by many different independent actors to create a new 
universal and affordable private health insurance market.140 
                                                          
 136. See, e.g., Roxana Tiron, Boehner Says House to Seek Repeal of Health-
Care Law, BLOOMBERG (June 19, 2012, 11:24 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2012-06-19/boehner-says-house-to-seek-repeal-of-health-care-law.html. 
 137. See State Actions to Implement Health Insurance Exchanges, NAT’L 
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/state-
actions-to-implement-the-health-benefit-exch.aspx (last updated Oct. 2012). 
 138. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No.11-393, slip op. at 11 (U.S. 
June 28, 2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 139. Cf. Abigail Moncrieff, The Freedom of Health, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 2209, 
2213 (2011). 
 140. Sebelius, No. 11-383, slip op. at 53 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“[T]he Act attempts to achieve near-universal health 
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Health insurance companies are not only required to comply 
with the nondiscrimination and guaranteed issue 
requirements, but they also must be willing to offer products in 
the Exchanges.141 The biggest market challenge to the success 
and sustainability of this new insurance market is ensuring the 
plans offered through the Exchanges are affordable.142 The 
plans offered within the Exchanges must offer the essential 
benefits package.143 To keep plans affordable, the Institute of 
Medicine recommends the essential benefits be structured after 
a typical small group plan rather than more expensive and 
generous large group plan coverage.144 Moreover, despite the 
ACA’s nondiscrimination and community rating requirements, 
health plans will still have an incentive to try to attract 
healthier persons to minimize their insurance risk, and 
individuals will not necessarily aggregate evenly by their own 
degree of risk within the options offered.145 Some degree of risk 
selection will still persist within the Exchanges where 
premiums will not reflect the actual risk posed by those with 
insurance, which can destabilize the insurance market within 
the Exchanges.146 
In addition to the cooperation of health insurance firms, 
the states must administer the Exchanges; ideally, they 
function as a transparent and competitive market.147 The 
                                                          
insurance coverage by spreading its costs to individuals, insurers, 
governments, hospitals, and employers . . . .”). 
 141. Cf. id. at 60 (“In the absence of federal subsidies to purchasers, 
insurance companies will have little incentive to sell insurance on the 
exchanges.”). 
 142. See id. at 59–60 (discussing how federal subsidies are necessary to 
keep plans offered on the exchanges both available and affordable). 
 143. Id. at 45–46 (majority opinion) (“The Act also establishes a new 
‘essential health benefits’ package, which States must provide to all new 
Medicaid recipients—a level sufficient to satisfy a recipient’s obligations under 
the individual mandate.”). 
 144. See INST. OF MED., supra note 20, at 6–7 (“[T]he committee endorses 
 . . . using as the cost target the estimated national average premium that 
would have been paid by small employers in 2014 . . . .”); see also Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, § 1302, 124 Stat 163, 
163–68 (2010). 
 145. See Jonathan P. Weiner et al., Adjusting for Risk Selection in State 
Health Insurance Exchanges Will Be Critically Important and Feasible, But 
Not Easy, 31 HEALTH AFF. 306, 306–09 (2012). 
 146. Cf. id. at 310. 
 147. Cf. Sebelius, No. 11-393, slip op. at 52 (U.S. June 28, 2012) (Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“States are expected to . . . 
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states play key roles in gathering price and quality data from 
participating health plans to give consumers enough 
information to make informed purchasing choices.148 The 
Exchanges are also responsible for providing information to the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regarding 
whether individuals are qualified for tax credit subsidies or 
whether their employer-offered coverage meets affordability 
requirements.149 Some states, however, have refused to begin 
implementing the Exchanges due to political opposition or 
uncertainty pending the outcome of legal challenges to the 
ACA.150 
The ACA’s right to health care relies upon market 
competition, an increase in the pool of those with insurance and 
several other indirect mechanisms to keep premium prices for 
health insurance offered in the Exchanges under control.151  
The removal of a government-offered “public option” health 
plan from the final bill eliminated an additional tool to foster 
competition and exert downward pressure on prices in the 
Exchanges.152 With Medicare, by contrast, the government is 
the payer and can set its prices and implement payment and 
health care delivery reforms to try to keep its costs down.153 
                                                          
create regulated marketplaces where individuals can purchase insurance.”). 
 148. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-48 
§ 1311, 124 Stat. 119, 173–81 (2010). 
 149. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 § 1411. 
 150. See State Actions to Implement Health Insurance Exchanges, supra 
note 137 (reporting that as of October 2012, 17 states have not undertaken 
legislative efforts to begin implementation of Exchanges); Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act § 1321 (establishing that if states or regions do not 
implement the Exchanges by their implementation deadline, the federal 
government will operate the Exchange). 
 151. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 § 9001, amended 
by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 
§ 1401, 124 Stat. 1029 (showing taxes on high-cost “Cadillac” plans as a 
mechanism to keep insurance premiums low). Another mechanism to keep 
insurance premiums low is to tax medical loss ratios.  Id. §§ 9010, 10050. 
 152. See Pear & Calmes, supra note 56, at A18. 
 153. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 § 3022 
(establishing the Medicare Shared Savings Program for the formation of 
accountable care organizations); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 
2010 § 3023 (establishing a pilot program on payment bundling); Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 § 3001 (establishing value-based 
purchasing for hospitals);  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 
§ 3025 (discussing provisions to cut Medicare payments by eliminating 
payments for excess hospital readmissions); Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act of 2010 § 2702 (stopping payments for hospital-acquired conditions); 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3401, amended by Health Care 
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The authors of the ACA believed a right to health care for 
the uninsured could be made accessible and affordable through 
market forces and competition. The reliance on the private 
market may have been politically necessary, but this strategy 
depends on a myriad of potentially reluctant actors coming 
together to create a viable insurance market where one has not 
previously succeeded. 
C. QUASI-SUPERSTATUTES 
The literature on subconstitutionalism presents the 
concept of superstatutes as a binary question: a piece of 
legislation either is or is not a superstatute.154 The discussion 
of subconstitutionalism would benefit from  further refinement 
to include a third category of “quasi-superstatutes.” These 
quasi-superstatutes are statutes that have the ambition of 
addressing an important social problem and undergo serious 
public deliberation (two qualities of superstatutes), but fail to 
achieve the entrenchment necessary to deliver their promised 
solution.155 These statutes are quasi-superstatutes because the 
rights or new legal norms they create are not fully accepted by 
the public, either because the public support is lacking or 
because not enough of the public experiences the benefits of the 
new right or legal norm to create functional entrenchment 
before it is rolled back by courts or future Congresses. The 
apparent fragility of the ACA’s central aim, to create a right to 
health care for the uninsured, makes it more likely that the 
ACA will be a quasi-superstatute than a superstatute. 
One example of a quasi-superstatute is the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA).156 When it passed, the ADA was 
heralded as an “emancipation proclamation” for the disabled.157 
                                                          
and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1105, 124 
Stat. 1029 (discussing reduction in the Part A “market basket” annual 
increases); Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 § 1102 
(discussing reduction in payments under Medicare Advantage). 
 154. See A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 26–28 (describing 
attributes of superstatutes, but not mentioning the result or ability of only 
partial satisfying superstatute criteria). 
 155. See id. at 26 (providing additional information on the three 
overarching attributes of superstatutes). 
 156. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 
Stat. 327. 
 157. See Edmund Newton, Disabled: The Battle Goes On, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
16, 1990, at E1 (describing the statute as “an ‘emancipation proclamation’ for 
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The employment discrimination and accommodation provisions 
were designed to dramatically increase access to and 
maintenance of jobs for the disabled.158 To be sure, the ADA 
has created significant benefits for the disabled, such as the 
changes to the built environment requiring handicap-
accessibility to public buildings, sidewalks, and 
transportation.159 But many agree the ADA fell short on its 
initial promise of increasing employment among disabled 
persons.160 The prevailing theory for why the ADA failed to live 
up to its promise is the judiciary’s hostility to the ADA’s 
employment protections.161 This reflects a general public 
backlash against what were perceived as onerous 
accommodation requirements for employers and a lack of public 
support for the disabled. As of 2007, an estimated 97% of cases 
brought to enforce the ADA’s employment provisions had been 
decided in favor of employers,162 and employment rates among 
the disabled declined or stayed flat in the first decade following 
the ADA’s passage.163 With the ADA, the Supreme Court’s 
                                                          
43 million disabled Americans”); see also 136 Cong. Rec. 17,369 (1990) 
(statement of Sen. Harkin) (displaying the language as attributed to Senator 
Harkin); 135 Cong. Rec. 19,888 (1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (displaying 
the language as attributed to Senator Kennedy). 
 158. Michael Selmi, Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act: Why 
the Supreme Court Rewrote the Statute, and Why Congress Did Not Care, 76 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 522 (2008). 
 159. See, e.g., id. at 553, 574. 
 160. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 78 (2002) 
(discussing whether or not an employee can be screened from employment 
because of their disability and its relation to the employee’s safety); Sutton v. 
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999) (discussing the word 
“disability”); see also Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., “Substantially Limited” 
Protection from Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and 
Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 539–46 
(1997); Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights 
Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 22 (2000); Chai R. Feldblum, 
Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What 
Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 91, 139–60 (2000); Aviam Soifer, The Disability Term: Dignity, Default, 
and Negative Capability, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1279, 1303–08 (2000); Michael 
Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as 
Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PENN. L. REV. 579, 631–36 (2004); Rebecca Hanner 
White, Deference and Disability Discrimination, 99 MICH. L. REV. 532, 537–39 
(2000). 
 161. See Selmi, supra note 158, at 526–27. 
 162. Amy L. Allbright, 2006 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I 
- Survey Update, 31 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 328, 328 (2007). 
 163. See INST. OF MED. COMM. ON DISABILITY IN AM., THE FUTURE OF 
DISABILITY IN AMERICA 454–56 (Marilyn J. Field & Alan M. Jette eds., 2007), 
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narrow interpretations were a type of retrenchment. The 
retrenchment was furthered when the political process failed to 
correct the Court’s narrowing of the ADA’s protections. Indeed, 
some have theorized the Court’s decisions were based on 
perceptions of the public’s lack of support for broad mandates 
for disability accommodations or Congressional ambivalence 
when drafting the ADA.164 
A statute becomes entrenched through the recursive 
interpretation, implementation, expansion, and refinement by 
courts, agencies, and future legislatures.165 Conversely, a 
statute may become retrenched through narrowing judicial 
interpretation, failures of enforcement or implementation by 
agencies, and Congressional antipathy or apathy toward 
statutory fixes, refinement, or expansion.166 The lack of public 
support required to achieve the functional entrenchment 
necessary to become a superstatute differentiates superstatutes 
from their quasi-super counterparts. The narrow judicial 
interpretations of the ADA’s provisions could be corrected by a 
public push for Congressional action to restore and clarify the 
ADA. Congress’s long silence on the issue may have signaled 
that such public support was lacking.167 The ACA’s embattled 
individual mandate is not susceptible to a simple legislative 
fix.168 As discussed above, the ACA faced not only judicial 
                                                          
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK11434/pdf/TOC.pdf. 
 164. See Selmi, supra note 158 at 526–27. 
 165. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 9, at 1229–30. 
 166. Cf. id. at 1228. 
 167. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 
Stat. 3553 (showing in 2008 Congressional passage of the ADA Amendments 
Act was eighteen years after the ADA’s initial passage); Jeannette Cox, 
Crossroads and Signposts: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 85 IND. L.J. 
187, 188 (2010) (discussing reversal of the courts’ narrow interpretation of the 
term “disability,” which thus broadened the class of persons covered by the 
ADA); see also, e.g., Stacy A. Hickox, The Underwhelming Impact of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 419, 
421–22 (2011) (discussing that despite Congress’ effort to counter the 
judiciary’s narrowing of the ADA, scholars are skeptical of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act Amendments Act’s impact on the employment prospects for 
disabled individuals because Congress left unchanged the difficult standard 
that a person must prove he or she is “substantially limited” in a major life 
activity to be considered disabled under the Act.). 
 168. Options for the individual mandate include restructuring the mandate 
as a voluntary incentive (such as a tax credit) to purchase health insurance 
without a penalty, which may as a policy matter reduce the number of those 
who become insured and increase the costs of coverage. 
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challenges to its key individual mandate provision, but also 
faces political and market challenges that could undermine the 
public support for its guarantee of health care access to the 
uninsured.169 
Falling into the category of quasi-superstatutes does not 
mean that a statute may never emerge as a superstatute. For 
example, the 2008 amendments to the ADA overrode many of 
the courts’ previous interpretations that narrowed the 
definition of a “disability.”170 Although some believe the ADA 
amendments did not go far enough, such Congressional action 
could be the type of incremental legislative elaboration and 
strengthening that eventually rescues the ADA from the quasi-
superstatute category.171 Statutes and public opinion are not 
fixed entities, and especially for statutes that have failed to 
become functionally entrenched through broad public support, 
legal and social norms can evolve with public opinion. 
That a would-be superstatute could end up as a quasi-
superstatute underscores the point that the way a new right or 
legal norm is structured and implemented matters as much as 
mustering the political will to get it passed in the first place.172 
Congress, for example, has been accused of intentionally 
leaving vague critical terms in the ADA, such that courts’ 
narrow interpretations of these terms were consistent with 
Congress’s own ambivalence.173 Although Congress can amend, 
expand, or refine a statute that fails to achieve its initial 
promise, it is not always easy to garner the political will and 
interest group coordination necessary for statutory fixes as 
                                                          
 169. See supra Part II.B. 
 170. Compare Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-336, 
104 Stat. 327 with Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, 
the ADA Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3555 (2009). 
 171. See Hickox, supra note 167, at 421–22. 
 172. See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of 
Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 704 (2011) (“[N]othing 
about the process or pedigree of enactment guarantees the sustainability of 
general-interest reforms. What matters, instead, is that the downstream 
political process is structured in a way that gives residual as well as newly 
created supporters of these reforms sufficient political power to fend off 
attacks from opponents.”). 
 173. See Selmi, supra note 158, at 526–27 (arguing that despite the ADA’s 
broad bipartisan support in Congress when passed, the ADA’s textual 
vagueness on key provisions such as what constitutes a “disability” is evidence 
that Congress itself was ambivalent about to whom and what extent its 
protections should apply). 
FUSE BROWN_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/2013  11:40 AM 
480  MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 14:1 
 
 
coalitions may quickly dissipate following passage.174 Moreover, 
it may be easier to gather public support for legislative 
enhancement to a popular superstatute than for a quasi-
superstatute that is marked by the stigma of disappointment 
and ineffectiveness. A statute that fails to deliver benefits 
quickly to a sufficient group may lack the sustained interest-
group advocacy necessary for a would-be superstatute to 
become entrenched in the public’s mind. The cautionary tale of 
quasi-superstatutedom can shed light on how a statute like the 
ACA may move from its fragile start to become a superstatute 
that guarantees a durable right to health care. 
III. DEVELOPING A DURABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE 
The apparent fragility of the ACA’s right to health care 
contains lessons regarding strategic considerations for 
developing a durable right to health care. Much of the 
vulnerability of the right to health care is concentrated early in 
the ACA’s lifespan, during the long time frame between its 
passage and the delivery of its benefits. If it survives this 
critical period, the right to health care could become 
increasingly entrenched as interest groups emerge to defend 
the right and political feedback strengthens the existing 
arrangement relative to those who seek its repeal. This Part 
first outlines a path for the ACA’s right to health care to 
become a durable right and then discusses the lessons to be 
gleaned from the ACA’s early vulnerabilities for the 
development of a durable right to health care. 
A. THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S PATH TO DURABILITY 
The ACA’s fragile right to health care is most vulnerable in 
its infancy. Its prospects of becoming a durable right depend on 
its survival until the point that its benefits begin. Most of the 
benefits of the ACA’s right to health care for the uninsured will 
not begin to take effect until 2014, and they could require 
several additional years to reach full implementation.175 Some 
                                                          
 174. See Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L.  
REV. 813, 828 (1998); Levinson, supra note 172, at 704. 
 175. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 55, at tbl.2 (showing that 
initial CBO estimates of coverage for newly uninsured use a five-year timeline 
(2014–2019) to estimate the total coverage effects of the ACA’s insurance 
reforms and Medicaid expansion). 
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benefits took effect soon after passage, including: provisions 
allowing young adults under the age of twenty-six to remain on 
their parents’ health insurance policies, prohibitions on denials 
of coverage for children with preexisting conditions, and the 
creation of temporary high-risk pools for adults with 
preexisting conditions.176 But these benefits appear to have had 
a negligible effect on broader public support of the Act, perhaps 
because the benefits of these smaller programs do not outweigh 
the larger political opposition to the individual mandate.177 
Principles of behavioral economics explain how statutes and 
regulations gain entrenchment through positive political 
feedback: the reform can sow the seeds of its own political 
support by endowing emerging interest groups with valuable 
benefits.178 
The endowment effect predicts that once established, 
statutory or regulatory schemes have a stronger tendency 
toward maintenance of the status quo over advocates for 
change or retrenchment.179 The endowment effect describes the 
phenomenon where individuals’ aversion to changes perceived 
as a loss of existing benefits exceeds their motivation to obtain 
the benefit in the first place.180 For example, a person who 
bought a bottle of wine for $5 thirty years ago may refuse to 
sell the wine to a wine merchant for $100 today, though he is 
unwilling to spend $100 to purchase the same bottle of wine.181 
In a statutory context, the advantage of the endowment effect’s 
inertia against change only applies once the statute has been 
                                                          
 176. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
48, § 1001, 124 Stat. 119, 130–131, amended by Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, §§ 1004, 2301, 124 Stat. 1029, 
1034–1036, 1081–1082 (expanding coverage for dependents up to age twenty-
six); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1201,  amended by Health 
Care and Education Reconciliation Act § 2301 (prohibiting health plans from 
excluding children under nineteen on the basis of preexisting condition); 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1101 (creating temporary 
highrisk pools for adults with preexisting conditions). 
 177. See KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 112, at 8 (table showing lack of 
increase in public support of the ACA). 
 178. See Levinson, supra note 172, at 687. 
 179. See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1266–67 (2003). 
 180. See Cherie Metcalf, Introduction: Emerging Paradigms of 
Rationality—Theory and Applications, 35 QUEEN’S L.J. 1, 12–14 (2009) 
(providing additional information on the endowment effect). See generally 
Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980) (explaining endowment effect). 
 181. Thaler, supra note180, at 43. 
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established—when all its institutions, benefits, and procedures 
have been fully implemented.182 If the ACA’s right to health 
care can survive the long and uncertain implementation phase, 
the tens of millions of individuals, plus the health insurance 
plans, employers, and providers who stand to benefit, could 
create a strong constituency of support that may lead to its 
entrenchment. 
Whether or not they coalesce into a politically active 
interest group, a diverse group of individuals and entities will 
gain valuable benefits under the ACA’s reforms.183 For 
example, groups of people who typically lack employer-
sponsored health care, such as those who lose their jobs, work 
for a small business, work part time, or retire early, would all 
potentially benefit from the availability of affordable, non-
excludable health plans on the Exchanges and tax credit 
subsidies to purchase health insurance.184 The problem with 
these groups is that although they might account for millions of 
individuals at any given time, people may move fluidly through 
these different statuses of employment. Long-term membership 
in this group of beneficiaries could be limited. More stable 
groups of defenders may emerge, such as individuals with 
preexisting medical conditions who lack large group or 
government-provided coverage for long periods of time due to 
inability to work. In addition, employers may increasingly 
embrace the Exchanges as a cost-effective option to provide 
health insurance to their employees.185 Though subject to 
significant additional regulation, health insurance companies 
could join the defenders of the ACA to keep the millions of new 
customers who had previously remained outside the health 
insurance market.186 Health care providers may also welcome 
the influx of additional insured patients and concomitant 
                                                          
 182. Korobkin, supra note 179, at 1266–67. 
 183. See Who Benefits from Health Care Ruling?, MSN MONEY (Jun. 28, 
2012, 3:29 PM), http://money.msn.com/health-and-life-insurance/ 
article.aspx?post=8c68398b-f0cf-48e5-8216-d29b2b4547cf. 
 184. See KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE 
UNINSURED: A PRIMER—KEY FACTS ABOUT AMERICANS WITHOUT HEALTH 
INSURANCE 2–7, 11–13 (2006). 
 185. Christine Eibner, Peter Hussey, and Federico Girosi, The Effects of the 
Affordable Care Act on Workers’ Health Insurance Coverage, 363 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1393, 1393–65 (2010). 
 186. Robert I. Field, Regulation, Reform and the Creation of Free Market 
Health Care, 32 HAMLINE J. PUB.L. & POL’Y 301, 324, 329 (2011). 
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reductions in uninsured and unreimbursed care.187 Drug 
manufacturers and others who will supply the medical needs of 
the newly covered also stand to benefit.188 With the benefits of 
health insurance coverage, new customers, or new patients, the 
endowment effect predicts that the beneficiaries of the ACA’s 
right to health care will have greater motivation (and thus 
exert greater political pressure) to maintain these benefits than 
opponents will have to repeal the law.189 
The phenomenon of political entrenchment can be 
compared to the economic notion of increasing returns, which 
stems from the amplification of initial choices through path 
dependence.190 A classic example of the phenomenon has been 
observed in the persistence of the QWERTY keyboard layout 
due to historical, seemingly insignificant accidents that gave 
this layout an advantage in the market over other more 
efficient layouts.191 In a more salient example, the complex 
structure of health care coverage in the U.S. (split between 
private, employment-based coverage for workers, government-
based coverage for seniors, the poor, and the disabled, and 
large coverage gaps of uninsured) has been attributed to 
historical decisions by government and private firms to 
subsidize employment-based health insurance and to remove 
costly, difficult-to-insure populations from the private health 
insurance market into government programs.192 
The factors that explain the entrenchment of political 
arrangements have been analogized to factors that lead to 
increasing economic returns: (1) political arrangements that 
have large setup costs increase incentives to maintain the 
initial arrangement; (2) political institutions that are tailored 
to the political arrangement increase the cost of change; and (3) 
                                                          
 187. Id. at 324. 
 188. Reed Abelson, In Health Care Overhaul, Boons for Hospitals and Drug 
Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2010, at B1. 
 189. See Gillette, supra note 174, at 827; see also Louise Radnofsky, Repeal 
Health Law? It Won’t Be Easy, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702036875045766551304862048
62.html (arguing that repealing “ObamaCare” will not be as easy as many 
presidential candidates propose). 
 190. See Levinson, supra note 172, at 690. 
 191. See, e.g., Ron Martin & Peter Sunley, Path Dependence and Regional 
Economic Evolution, 6 J. OF ECON. GEOG. 395, 399–400 (2006). 
 192. See Jacob S. Hacker, The Historical Logic of National Health 
Insurance: Structure and Sequence in the Development of British, Canadian, 
and U.S. Medical Policy, 12 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 57, 107 (1998). 
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political coordination by interest groups increase inertia and 
stability in the status quo as more people rely upon and expect 
to utilize the arrangement moving forward.193 As applied to the 
ACA, the costs of passage in terms of political will and 
coordination were large.194 In addition, the relative benefits of 
the institutional arrangement settled upon by the ACA may be 
magnified by comparison to the costs of returning to the pre-
ACA status where problems of uninsured and rising health 
care costs were largely unaddressed.195 Once states, health 
insurance providers, and other market players have sunk costs 
into developing institutions like Exchanges under the ACA, 
there will be a disincentive to dismantle these institutions in 
favor of other models.196 The coordination effect of the coalition 
of interest groups that could emerge to defend the ACA’s right 
to health care may increase the political value of the ACA’s 
benefits as more people come to count on them. Moreover, the 
longer the ACA’s individual mandate and other reforms persist, 
the less they may be perceived by opponents as infringements 
on liberty or economic interests. People become accustomed to 
existing legal and economic arrangements so that constraints, 
such as the payment of payroll taxes to fund Medicare or the 
obligation of all drivers to obtain auto insurance, are no longer 
viewed as objectionable.197 
Most of the public outrage at the ACA has focused on the 
individual mandate, which appears to have driven the majority 
of the opposition to the ACA generally.198 Once implemented, 
opposition to the mandate may decline if the 83% of Americans 
who already have coverage through their employer or a 
                                                          
 193. Levinson, supra note 172, at 690. 
 194. David E. Sanger, For Historic Stakes, a Big Obama Gamble on a 
Partisan Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2010, at A1. 
 195. See Levinson, supra note 172, at 684 (“[T]he greater the costs of 
recoordinating on a different settlement, the more resilient we should expect 
current institutional arrangements to be. Institutional arrangements that are 
costly to set up and costly to do without will be protected by substantial 
coordination buffers.”). 
 196. See id. 
 197. Id. at 691. 
 198. See Radnofsky, supra note 189 (citing a Kaiser Health Tracking Poll 
finding 67% of those polled would repeal the individual mandate, but 
significant majorities would keep other ACA provisions including tax credits 
for small businesses to offer health coverage to employees (82%), prohibitions 
on denials of coverage for preexisting conditions (73%), and tax-credit 
subsidies for low income Americans to purchase coverage (72%)). 
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government program realize their own health care coverage 
will remain relatively unaffected by the ACA.199 For many of 
those previously uninsured who will have to purchase 
insurance under the mandate, the sting of being forced to buy 
health insurance may be lessened if their policy is subsidized 
by tax credits, they are eligible for Medicaid under its expanded 
eligibility criteria, or, as young adults, they may purchase low-
cost, catastrophic policies to meet the requirement.200 Many 
others, such as those with preexisting health conditions, will 
purchase their health insurance gladly, happy to have access to 
health coverage at all. 
These models from behavioral economics tell us that the 
opponents of the ACA, while formidable, are in a race against 
the implementation of its benefits. If the ACA’s key provisions 
survive to implementation, the endowment effect and 
increasing political returns will begin to ossify and entrench 
the ACA’s institutional structures and increase the durability 
of its right to health care. 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A DURABLE RIGHT 
TO HEALTH CARE 
The structure of the ACA’s right to health care for the 
uninsured through private insurance reforms was driven by 
political necessity.201 To gain enough votes to pass, the 
legislation had to cover the uninsured through expansions in 
the private health insurance market rather than solely through 
government benefit programs.202 The ACA’s coverage structure 
reflects the existing health care system’s coverage based on 
private, employer-based health insurance and piecemeal 
government coverage for subgroups, rather than an effort to 
design the optimal system for universal coverage and 
                                                          
 199. U.S. Health Insurance (Quartley), GALLUP-HEALTHWAYS WELL-BEING 
INDEX, http://www.gallup.com/poll/151190/health-insurance-quarterly.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (poll showing eighty-three percent of Americans 
report having insurance coverage). 
 200. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
48, § 1401, 124 Stat. 119, 213–20 (premium subsidies); Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010 § 2001 (Medicaid expansion); Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act of 2010 § 1302 (catastrophic plans for young adults 
under thirty). 
 201. See Arnold J. Rosoff, Of Stars and Proper Alignment: Scanning the 
Heavens for the Future of Health Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2100, 2116–
17 (2011). 
 202. See id. 
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administration of health care services.203 Absent a significant 
turn of political will to upend the path-dependent system that 
emerged from the early choices to link health care coverage to 
employment, any effort to create a durable right to health care 
will face similar political and practical challenges as the 
ACA.204 There are, however, a few lessons to be drawn from the 
challenges faced by the ACA for designers of health care 
coverage strategies, including lessons about implementation 
timeframes, complexity, uncertainty, and structure. 
The largest lesson is that the timeframe for 
implementation of the ACA’s right to health care is too long. 
The four-year lag between the Act’s passage and most of its 
reforms spans two elections and gives opponents time to 
mobilize political challenges before the beneficiaries of the Act 
begin to realize most of its benefits. Unlike the seniors who 
gained Medicare benefits within a year of its passage, the 
interest groups that coalesced around the ACA’s passage may 
fracture and cool before public support emerges from the 
delivery of popular benefits. The campaign to educate the 
public about the ACA’s benefits is more difficult because the 
benefits remain years away. Over time, the public, even those 
who previously supported the Act, may start to doubt that they 
will benefit under the provisions of the ACA.205 
The long time frame for implementation of the health 
insurance reforms may have been driven by the nature of the 
private insurance market, whose financial models and 
underwriting practices span years rather than months.206 In 
addition, the time frame allows states time to organize the new 
marketplaces for health insurance plans. States must 
undertake initiatives to implement the Exchanges and create 
new administrative bodies to oversee implementation, often 
                                                          
 203. See id. at 2097–99 (discussing the historical origins and subsequent 
entrenchment of the U.S. employer-based health insurance system). 
 204. See id. at 2100 (“We can imagine and argue for all types of health care 
system models and configurations—single-payer governmental systems, mixed 
public-private systems, employment-based private systems, managed 
competition, and so on—but any debate must begin with what we presently 
have.”). 
 205. See KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 112, at 11 (suggesting that 
supporters of the health reform law are beginning to lose confidence they will 
ever actually benefit from the law). 
 206. See INST. OF MED., supra note 20, at 84 (tables demonstrating the fact 
that financial modeling occurs over years). 
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through separate state legislation.207 It is unclear whether the 
four-year time frame for implementation was the shortest 
period in which the coverage reforms could be implemented 
realistically or whether it was agreed upon as a concession to 
the health insurance industry and states to ease the burden of 
implementation. When compared to Medicare’s single-payer 
administration and one-year implementation, the decision to 
distribute the responsibility for health care coverage reforms 
among myriad private health insurers and the fifty states 
might explain why the implementation is so lengthy under the 
ACA. In this manner, the long time frame for realization of the 
right to health care under the ACA points to another lesson for 
designers of a right to health care: the role of complexity. 
The complexity of the ACA generally, and the mechanics of 
its right to health care specifically, may stand in the way of its 
public support.208 Most of the public still does not understand 
the main features of the right to health care under the ACA, 
not to mention the interlocking nature of the nondiscrimination 
provisions, health insurance Exchanges, tax credits and 
subsidies, and the individual mandate.209 The case for opposing 
the individual mandate (i.e., that government is forcing you to 
purchase an expensive product you do not wish to buy) seems 
easier for the public to understand intuitively than the idea 
that the individual mandate is economically necessary to have 
health insurance policies that do not discriminate on the basis 
of preexisting conditions or health status.210 As pointed out 
earlier, months or years after passage, the uninsured that 
stand to benefit most directly still do not understand or believe 
the ACA will help them.211 Complexity is a barrier to durability 
when it makes implementation and selling the new law to the 
public difficult.212 
                                                          
 207. See State Actions to Implement Health Insurance Exchanges, supra 
note 137. 
 208. See Forrest Maltzman & Charles R. Shipan, Change, Continuity, and 
the Evolution of the Law, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 252, 257 (2008) (“Major laws that 
are more complex are more likely to be amended.”). 
 209. See KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 112, at 7 (showing public 
confusion over the elements of the ACA). 
 210. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 211. See Altman, supra note 118. 
 212. Atul Gawande, Something Wicked This Way Comes, NEW YORKER 
(June 28, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2012/06/ 
something-wicked-this-way-comes.html (arguing that the ACA’s attempt to 
cover the uninsured addresses a “wicked problem” that is messy, ill-defined, 
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A third lesson is that, to the extent possible, the right to 
health care should not be built upon an uncertain legal 
foundation.213 Although the individual mandate was upheld by 
the Supreme Court in June 2012, the intervening twenty-seven 
months while the legal challenges were pending spelled a 
period of suspended animation for the implementation of many 
of the law’s key provisions.214 The legal challenges to the 
individual mandate undermined the right to health care by 
introducing uncertainty to the implementation process.215 
States have been wary of spending resources to assemble the 
Exchanges.216 The insurance industry’s amicus brief to the 
Supreme Court was an unvarnished plea for resolution of the 
uncertainty as health plans prepared to come into compliance 
with the ACA’s myriad health insurance reforms.217 Even those 
individuals who understand the health insurance protections 
scheduled to take effect in 2014 may not feel confident that 
those benefits will survive legal or political challenge. The 
result of this uncertainty is that stakeholders throughout the 
system engaged in a kind of stutter-step, which prevented them 
from sinking resources toward implementation.218 Without 
sunk costs, the barriers to dismantling or abandoning the 
ACA’s right to health care are reduced.219 
                                                          
and complex, and  for such wicked problems, “[Generally,] reforms pursued 
straight forward goals but required inherently complicated, difficult-to-explain 
means of implementation”). 
 213. See Maltzman & Shipan, supra note 208, at 256–57. 
 214. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 215. See Brief for America’s Health Ins. Plans as Amicus Curiae in Partial 
Support of Certiorari Review at 5–10, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 
No. 11-393, slip op. (U.S. June 28, 2012). 
 216. See State Actions to Implement Health Insurance Exchanges, supra 
note 137 (showing a large number of states have not implemented Exchanges). 
 217. Brief for America’s Health Ins. Plans as Amicus Curiae in Partial 
Support of Certiorari Review, supra note 215, at 3 (“[Our] comprehensive 
compliance efforts, however, are being conducted in a cloud of uncertainty 
about the durability of the monumental changes being made and the legal 
regime that will govern insurance plans going forward. Only a prompt and 
definitive ruling by this Court on the individual mandate’s constitutionality 
can restore needed certainty to the health care market.”). 
 218. See id. at 3, 5–10; Gillette, supra note 174, at 819 (“[N]o single party 
will incur the costs of deviation from the existing standard without assurances 
that offsetting benefits can be realized as a result of mass movement to the 
new equilibrium.”). 
 219. See Martin & Sunley, supra note 191, at 412 (discussing inertia of 
sunk costs). 
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A final lesson is that the federal government’s options to 
strengthen the federal right to health care have been 
significantly hemmed in by the Roberts Court. One option is 
that the federal government could follow explicitly the roadmap 
set forth by the Court’s ruling on the ACA. If a right to health 
care is going to be delivered in significant portion through a 
private health insurance market, it will require something like 
an individual mandate to avoid the adverse selection death 
spiral. Such a mandate is beyond the power of a federal 
government unless it is functionally structured as a tax.220 This 
is a difficult political needle to thread—preserving the 
centrality of a private health insurance system without 
appearing to impermissibly compel individuals to purchase 
health insurance on the one hand, or raise taxes to fund such 
purchase on the other. Nor may Congress look to its spending 
power to impose conditions to expand, alter, or strengthen the 
right for those covered by large federal-state programs.221 
Medicaid, like the health care industry of which it is a part, is 
so large and consumes so much of the state budget that it was 
declared coercive for the federal government to require states to 
expand the program as a condition of keeping existing Medicaid 
dollars.222 The larger the spending program and the more 
dependent the state is on federal funding, the less power the 
federal government has to require states to agree to expand 
such programs before running afoul of federalism concerns, 
even if the expansion is almost entirely funded by federal 
dollars.223 
Another option remains: the federal government could 
undertake to finance and administer the health care program 
itself through a singlepayer system like Medicare. Although 
singlepayer health reform is often derided as politically 
infeasible, the ACA has taught us that health reform through 
private insurance expansion, with its individual mandate 
albatross, is fraught with its own political challenges: a right to 
                                                          
 220. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No. 11-393, slip op. at 35–36 
(U.S. June 28, 2012) (listing three factors that made the individual mandate, 
in the Court’s opinion, functionally operate as a tax as opposed to a penalty: 
(1) the amount of tax relative to the infraction is minimally burdensome 
compared to the cost of purchasing insurance; (2) there is no scienter 
requirement; and (3) the exaction is collected by the IRS through normal 
means of tax collection). 
 221. Id. at 50–54. 
 222. Id. at 50–52. 
 223. Id. 
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health care through private coverage must be crafted from a 
cabined spectrum of Congressional powers, but easily can be 
weighed down with so much complexity that it risks being 
incomprehensible to its own beneficiaries.224 A singlepayer 
system, funded with taxes and administered by the federal 
government, avoids the legal and market challenges of a right 
to health care that depends on coordination of private industry, 
individuals, and states. Although more politically difficult to 
pass through Congress, a single payer right to health care 
would have the advantage of quicker delivery of benefits, 
stronger interest group support, and a simpler concept for the 
public to understand (i.e., Medicare for all). The difference 
between the path taken by the ACA and the approach taken by 
Medicare might mean the difference between a fragile quasi-
superstatute and a durable superstatutory right to health care. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The ACA creates a new right to health care for the 
uninsured through private insurance market reforms.225 This 
expanded right, though momentous in its scope, was 
constructed in a way that was politically expedient and 
structurally fragile.226 Passed amidst bitter partisan division 
and an ambivalent public, the expanded benefits to the 
uninsured are poorly understood and slow to be implemented, 
while political opposition and opportunity for retrenchment 
grows.227 In addition, the right depends on private actors, 
private health insurance companies, and willing states to 
administer and participate in a newly transparent, competitive, 
and streamlined private health insurance market, while these 
same actors hesitate to invest in the infrastructure of this 
market due to uncertainty from legal and political challenges to 
the ACA.228 
All of these challenges make it more likely, in the short 
term, that the ACA’s right to health care will be ephemeral or 
hollow—a quasi-superstatute rather than a durable 
superstatute. The ACA’s weaknesses are time-limited and will 
                                                          
 224. See KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 112. 
 225. See supra Part I.C. 
 226. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 227. See id. 
 228. See supra Part I.C. 
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rapidly diminish if the right to health care survives until 
implementation.229 Once implemented, interest groups and 
institutional defenders could coalesce around its substantial 
benefits and begin to ossify its structure against political 
attack.230 The ACA’s fragility highlights the importance of how 
such social reforms are structured (or not) to achieve 
entrenchment and durability after the ink is dry on the new 
legislation. Failed reforms and quasi-superstatutes carry 
harms beyond the loss of the promised social good; they 
squander political and economic resources and create increased 
public distrust in the ability of legislative reform to deliver 
durable rights.231 
                                                          
 229. See supra Part III.A. 
 230. See id. 
 231. See supra Part III.B. 
